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A b s t r a c t 
A new multiplier that supports fields GF(p) and GF(2n) for the public-key cryptog­
raphy, and fields GF(2&) for the secret-key cryptography is proposed in this thesis. 
Based on the core multiplier and other extracted common operations, a novel hybrid 
crypto-processor is built which processes both public-key and secret-key cryptosys-
tems. The corresponding instruction set is also presented. Three cryptographic 
algorithms: the Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), AES and RC5 are focused to 
run in the processor. 
To compute scalar multiplication kP efficiently, a blend of efficient algorithms on 
elliptic curves and coordinates selections and of hardware architecture that supports 
arithmetic operations on finite fields is required. The Nonadjacent Form (NAF) of 
k is used in Jacobian projective coordinates over GF(p); Montgomery scalar multi­
plication is utilized in projective coordinates over GF(2n). The dual-field multiplier 
is used to support multiplications over GF(p) and GF(2n) according to multiple-
precision Montgomery multiplication algorithms. The design ideas for AES and 
RC5 are also described. 
The proposed hybrid crypto-processor increases the flexibility of security schemes 
and reduces the total cost of cryptosystems. 
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C h a p t e r 1 
I n t r o d u c t i o n 
1 . 1 Motivation 
The electronic world is increasingly influencing our lives. Every day hundreds of 
thousands of people interact electronically through e-mail, e-commerce (business 
conducted over the Internet), ATM machines, or cellular phones. This has led 
to an increased reliance on the security of information transmitted electronically. 
By far the most effective ways to ensure network and communication security are 
related to cryptography. Cryptography is the study of mathematical techniques 
related to aspects of information security such as confidentiality, data integrity, 
entity authentication, and data origin authentication. Cryptography is not the 
only means of providing information security, but rather a set of techniques [30]. 
Two types of cryptographic tools are commonly used: secret-key cryptography and 
public-key cryptography. For secret-key cryptography, RC5 and AES are two widely 
used important algorithms, while for public-key cryptography, the vast majority of 
the products and standards use RSA algorithm based on the integer factorization. 
Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) is another approach to public-key cryptography 
based on the mathematics of elliptic curves. The primary advantage of elliptic 
curve cryptosystems over RSA is the absence of a sub-exponential-time algorithm 
that could solve the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in the elliptic curve groups 
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[5]. Consequently, ECC can maintain the same level of security with a far smaller 
key size, therefore reducing processing overhead. 
It is necessary to implement cryptographic algorithms in hardware due to the fact 
that software implementations are too slow to satisfy the real-time requirement. For 
efficiency reasons, usually hybrid encryption systems are used in practice; a key is 
exchanged using a public-key cipher, and the rest of the communication is encrypted 
using a symmetric-key algorithm (which is typically much faster). So it is necessary 
to design a chip that performs hybrid encryption systems for the user's convenience. 
Many hardware implementations of cryptosystems have been proposed to speed up 
the throughput while keeping the circuit area as small as possible. These designs 
can utilize the hardware resources and customize the architecture to maximize the 
efficiency of the implementations. However, most of the designs are dedicated to 
specific cryptographic algorithms. For example, many chips that only can perform 
AES algorithms have been discussed for secret-key cryptosystems, while others are 
proposed to speed up the public-key cryptosystems. Very little of the literature deals 
with hardware designs to implement both secret-key and public-key cryptosystems. 
A crypto-processor in [18] can perform secret-key algorithms AES and triple-DES, 
and public-key algorithms RSA and ECC. However, it uses dedicated coprocessor 
blocks for each algorithm, which consumes lots of hardware area. Also, it can only 
perform ECC over specific binary field GF(2l4G). In this thesis, a processor that 
can flexibly deal with both secret-key algorithms for AES and RC5 and public-
key algorithms for ECC over fields GF(p) and GF(2n) with variable parameters is 
proposed. 
1 . 2 L i t e r a t u r e R e v i e w 
Many hardware implementations on Field-Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) and 
Application-Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) have been presented for elliptic curve 
2 
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cryptosystems and for AES and RC5, respectively. A review of the previous work 
is given in this section. 
1 . 2 . 1 H a r d w a r e S p e e d - u p o f S e c r e t - k e y A l g o r i t h m s 
Due to the simple computation compared with public-key cryptography and dedi­
cation to specific secret-key algorithm, chip designs used in the hardware speed-up 
of secret-key cryptography are much simpler. Since the invention of AES, many 
efficient hardware implementations on FPGA or ASIC are presented [50, 53, 29, 6, 
24, 25]. References [26, 46] propose hardware architectures for the RC5 block cipher. 
However there is little literature that deals with hardware implementations on 
several secret-key algorithms in one chip. A bulk encryption crypto-processor dedi­
cated to smart cards was designed which could perform DES and 3DES algorithms 
[47]. 
1 . 2 . 2 P r o c e s s o r f o r E l l i p t i c C u r v e C r y p t o g r a p h y 
Many hardware implementations on elliptic curve cryptography have been proposed 
[2, 23, 10, 38, 36, 11, 39, 37, 4, 44, 12, 43, 9]. Binary field GF(2n) arithmetic is 
more suitable for fast and compact hardware than a prime field GF(p), because 
elements over GF(2n) are unsigned binary numbers and there is no need for carry 
propagation. However, conventional implementations for ECC over GF(2n) have 
little flexibility due to dedicated field parameters. Some designs [2, 23, 10] are based 
on the fixed size Massey-Omura multiplier [37] using optimal normal bases. Some 
[38, 36] are based on the specific polynomial bases. On the other hand, conventional 
ECC hardware designs over GF(p) [38] support only the specific prime numbers. 
So the restrictions of the conventional approaches reduce the flexibility of hardware 
implementations and limit the application areas. 
The Montgomery multiplication algorithm [32, 21] proposed by P.L Montgomery 
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in 1985 was for modular multiplication over GF{p) to avoid expensive division com­
putation. The algorithm was then extended to binary field GF(2n) [22]. This 
provides the guidance to unify the fields GF(p) and GF(2n) into one computation 
component. Several contributions based on dual-field multipliers have been made 
to support field arithmetic on both GF(p) and GF(2n). One hardware architec­
ture that uses carry-save adders to perform on dual-field operations is introduced in 
[44]. Processors based on a fully parallel multiplier that supports dual-field opera­
tions are presented in [43, 9], where n-bit operands need to be divided into m w-bit 
(word size) words to perform multiple-precision operations. This further provides 
the flexibility to accommodate elliptic curves with different key lengths. 
1 . 2 . 3 H a r d w a r e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n s f o r B o t h P u b l i c - k e y a n d 
S e c r e t - k e y C r y p t o s y s t e m s 
To our knowledge, very few hardware implementations of both public-key and secret-
key cryptosystems exist. Reference [18] presents a crypto-processor that can perform 
secret-key algorithms AES and triple-DES, and public-key algorithms RSA and 
ECC. However, its design uses dedicated coprocessor blocks for each algorithm, 
which consumes lots of hardware area. Also, it can only perform ECC over specific 
binary field GF(2U6). 
This section summarizes the previous hardware implementations of secret-key 
and public-key cryptosystems. They primarily focus on the specific algorithm or 
specific elliptic curve, thereby lacking certain flexibility. The processor based on a 
parallel dual-field multiplier makes it possible to perform elliptic curve cryptography 
on both GF(p) and GF(2n) with variable parameters. However, the author is aware 
of very few hardware designs that implement algorithms for both secret-key and 
public-key systems. 
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1.3 Contributions 
The thesis presents a novel hybrid crypto-processor that can process not only public-
key cryptography, such as ECC over GF(p) and GF(2n) with random key length, 
but also secret-key algorithms, such as AES and RC5. The main contributions of 
my thesis are as follows. 
1. The multiplier designed in this thesis is a novel 32-bit by 32-bit multiplication-
accumulator that integrates multiplications over GF(p), GF(2n) used in public-
key cryptosystem and GF(2&) used in secret-key cryptosystem. 
2. Unlike previous work, the hybrid crypto-processor in this thesis has more 
flexibility that can perform not only public-key algorithms such ECC over 
fields GF(p) and GF(2n), but also secret-key algorithms AES and RC5. 
3. The prime number p over GF(p) and the irreducible polynomial over GF(2n) 
can easily be changed to improve the security of the processor. 
1.4 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 introduces basic mathematical background which serves as the basis for 
discussions in later chapters. 
In chapter 3, an introduction to cryptography is presented which includes secret-
key and public-key cryptosystems. 
Chapter 4 describes the architecture of the proposed processor and the imple­
mentation details of ECC, AES and RC5. The core arithmetic component such as 
multi-function multiplier and barrel shifter are presented. The related algorithms 
used for the ECC design are discussed. Finally, the performance analysis and com­
parison with previous work are made. 
Conclusions and possible future work are given in Chapter 5. 
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M a t h e m a t i c a l B a c k g r o u n d 
Cryptographic algorithms rely heavily on the base of mathematics. For example, 
the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
are built on properties of finite fields. In this chapter, we review some necessary 
mathematical background in abstract algebra, in particular finite fields, which are 
relevant to the work in this thesis. 
2 . 1 Groups, Rings, and Fields 
A group (Cr, *) is a set together with a binary operation * (called the multiplication) 
on G such that 
1. Closure: g\ * g2 G G for all gi, g2 G G; 
2. Associative: gx * (g2 * gs) = (gi * g2) * # 3 for all gu g2, £ 3 € G; 
3. Identity element: there is an element e G G such that g * e = e * g for all 
9 & G; 
4. Inverse element: for each element g G G, there exists an element g' such that 
g * g' = g' * g = e. 
The element e is called the identity of the group G. The element g' is called the 
inverse of g, usually denoted by g~l. 
6 
C h a p t e r 2 M a t h e m a t i c a l B a c k g r o u n d 
A group G is said to be abelian or commutative if g\ * g2 = g2 * g\ for all g\, 
g2 G G. When G is an abelian group, the operation * is denoted by + , which is 
called the addition. The identity element e is denoted by 0, which is called the zero 
element. The inverse of g € G is denoted by —g, which is called the negative of g. 
A ring (i?, + , x) is an nonempty set R with two binary operations + and x , 
called addition and multiplication, such that 
1. (R, +) is an abelian group. 
2. Closure under multiplication: r\ x r2 G R for all r\, r 2 G R\ 
3. Associative under multiplication: r\ x ( r 2 x r 3 ) = ( r i x r 2 ) x r% for all r i , r 2 , 
r 3 G i2; 
4. Multiplication is distributive over addition: r\ x ( r 2 + r3) = r\ x r 2 + r\ x f3 
and ( r i + r 2 ) x r 3 = rx x r 3 + r 2 x r 3 for all n , r 2 , r 3 G i?. 
A ring R is said to be a commutative ring if r\ x r 2 = r 2 x r i for all r j , r 2 G -R. 
A field (F, + , x) is a set with two binary operations, called addition and mul­
tiplication, such that 
1. (F , + , x) is a commutative ring 
2. Multiplicative identity: There exists an element 1 such that a x l = l X f l = o 
for all a G F 
3. No zero divisors: If o, b G F and a x b = 0, then a = 0 or b = 0; 
4. Multiplicative inverse: For a G F and a ^ 0, there exists an element a - 1 G F 
such that a x a - 1 = a - 1 x a = 1 
A ring (R, + , x) is said to be an integral domain if it is a commutative ring with 
multiplicative identity and it contains no zero-divisors. A field is a set on which one 
can perform addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division. For this work, we 
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are only interested in fields with finite numbers of elements, which are called finite 
fields. More details about abstract algebra can be found in [13]. 
2 . 2 F i n i t e F i e l d s 
A finite field (F, +, x ) [49, 14] consists of a finite set of elements. The number of 
elements q in the field is called the order of F. It can be shown that there exists 
a finite field of order q if and only if q is a prime power pn, where n is a positive 
integer and p is a prime number. There is essentially only one finite field of order 
q = pn, denoted by GF(q) = GF{pn). Here p is called the characteristics of GF(pn) 
and n is called the extension degree. We are especially interested in two cases. For 
n = 1, and q = p (p ^ 2), we have GF(p); for p = 2, and q — 2 n , we have GF(2n). 
2 . 2 . 1 T h e F i n i t e F i e l d GF(p) 
The finite field GF(p), where p is an odd prime, also called a prime finite field, is 
defined as the set of integers { 0 , 1 , . . . ,p — 1}, together with the modular arithmetic 
operations. Since GF(p) is a field, it should satisfy the conditions mentioned in 
Section 2.1. Table 2.1 lists the properties of modular arithmetic operations in GF(p). 
2 . 2 . 2 T h e F i n i t e F i e l d GF(2n) 
The finite field GF(2n), also called a binary finite field, can be viewed as a vector 
space of dimension n over GF{2). There exist n elements {cuo, a\,..., a n - i } such 
that for each element a G GF(2n), a can be written uniquely as : 
a=aoao+aiai+ ... + a n _ i o ; n _ i , where a, G {0, 1} 
The set {a0, • • •»QV-i} is called a basis of GF(2n) over GF(2). Given such a 
basis, an element a can also be represented as the bit string (a0, a\,..., a n _ i ) . 
Polynomial basis and normal basis are two kinds of commonly used bases (see 
Johnson et al [15] for more details). 
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Commutative laws (w + x) (mod p) — (x + w) (mod p) 
(w x x) (mod p) = (x x w) (mod p) 
Associative laws [(w + x) + y] (mod p) = [w + (x + y)\ (mod p) 
[(w x x) x y] (mod p) = [ id x (re x y)) (mod p) 
Distributive laws [to x (x 4- y)] (mod p) = [(w x x) + (w x y)] (mod p) 
[(x + y) x w] (mod p) = [{x x w) + (y x w)] (mod p) 
Identities (0 + w) (mod p) = w (mod p) 
(1 x w) (mod p) = w (mod p) 
Additive inverse (—w) For each w € GF(p), 
there exists a 2; such that w + z = 0 (mod p) 
Multiplicative inverse w~l For each non-zero w G GF(p), 
there exists a value a such that a x w = 1 (mod p) 
Table 2.1: Properties of modular arithmetic operations in GF(p) 
P o l y n o m i a l Basis 
The finite field GF(2n) can also be viewed as a set of polynomials over GF(2), 
together with polynomial arithmetics. The polynomials are defined modulo an irre­
ducible polynomial f(x) whose highest power is integer n — 1. A polynomial f(x) 
over field GF{2) is called irreducible if and only if f(x) cannot be factored as a prod­
uct of polynomials in GF(2), with each highest degree less than n. An irreducible 
polynomial f(x) is also called a prime polynomial by analogy to primes in GF(p). 
Each f(x) defines a polynomial basis representation of GF(2n). The GF(2n) can 
be expressed in the following form after the irreducible polynomial is determined: 
GF(2n) = K . . ! ^ - 1 + an_2xn-2 + • • • + axx + a0\ at G {0,1}}, 
or in the bit string form: 
GF(2n) = { ( a n _ ! a n _ 2 . . . axa0)\ (H G {0,1}}. 
The arithmetic operations on the elements in GF(2n) are as follows. 
• Additive identity is represented as (00. . . 00). 
• Multiplicative identity is represented as (00 .. .01). 
• Addition: Due to the coefficient over GF(2), the addition operation is bitwise 
9 
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exclusive OR. Suppose a = ( a n _ i a n _ 2 . . . a0) and b = ( f e n _ 1 6 n _ 2 . . . b0) are 
elements of GF(2n), then a + b = c = ( c n _ j c n _ 2 • • • Cq), where Cj = Oj © 
i = 0 , . . . , n — 1. 
• Multiplication: Suppose a = ( a n _ i a n _ 2 . . . a0) and b = ( 6 n _ i 6 n _ 2 . . . bo) are 
elements in GF(2n) and /(a;) = / n - i z n _ 1 + fN-2XN~2 + • • • + fax + / 0 is the 
irreducible polynomial, then the product r = ( r n _ i r n _ 2 . . . ro) = a x b (mod 
• Inversion: Suppose a = ( a n _ i a n _ 2 . . . ao) is a nonzero element in GF(2n), then 
there exits a unique element c = ( c n _ i c n _ 2 . . . c 0) to satisfy c x a = 1 mod 
N o r m a l Basis 
A normal basis of GF(2n) is a basis of the form {/?, f32,(32\ . . . , / J 2 " - 1 } , where /3 € 
GF{2n). The GF(2n) can be expressed in the following form after a normal basis is 
determined: 
GF(2n) = {a0(3 +
 a i 0 l + ••• + a n _ 2 / 5 2 n " 2 + a n ^ 2 n ~ ' \ a{ G {0,1}}, 
or in the bit string form: 
GF(2n) = { ( a o 0 l . . ) | a i G { 0 , l } } . 
The arithmetic operations on the elements of GF(2n) are described in the following. 
• Additive identity is represented as (00. . . 00). 
• Multiplicative identity is represented as (11 . . . 11). 
• Addition: Due to the coefficients over GF(2), the addition operation is bitwise 
exclusive OR. Suppose a = ( a 0 a i . . . a n _i ) and b = (b0bi... 6 n _i) are elements 
of GF(2n), then a + b = c = (c 0 C\... c„_i), Cj = © 6j, •? = 0 , . . . , n — 1. 
• Multiplication: Suppose o = (aofli. . . a n - i ) and b = (boh • • • bn-\) are elements 
of GF(2n), then 
10 
C h a p t e r 2 M a t h e m a t i c a l B a c k g r o u n d 
c = a x b = ( E ; 
En—1 v -v n — 1 „ j=0 2 ^ j = 0 °i a,ibj/32'ft 
We can write 
n -1 
fc=0 
Substitution yields 
n—1n—1 
(2.1) 
j=0 j = 0 
• Squaring: Suppose a = ( a 0 O i . . . a n - i ) is an element of GF(2n), then 
The squaring is also represented in the string binary form: 
( a 0 a i G 2 • • • a n _ i ) 2 = ( a „ _ 1 a 0 a i . . . a n _ 2 ) . 
• Inversion: Suppose a = ( a o O i • • • a n - i ) is a nonzero element of GF(2n), then 
there exists a unique element c = ( c 0 C i . . . c n _ i ) to satisfy c x a = 1. 
In normal basis representation, the squaring operation is only the simple left circular 
shift. However, multiplication can be cumbersome in general. For some special 
finite fields of GF(2n), there exist Optimal Normal Bases (ONB) to simplify the 
multiplication. An ONB [34] is one with the minimum number of nonzero terms in 
Equation 2.1. 
2 . 3 S u m m a r y 
In this chapter, the concept of finite fields is introduced. Two kinds of important 
finite fields GF(p) and GF(2n) are discussed, which are the mathematical funda­
mental related to both public-key and secret-key cryptographic algorithms. Further­
more, the two bases representations of GF(2n), polynomial basis and normal basis, 
are explained. Even though the squaring in normal basis can be performed very 
efficiently, the arithmetic component for squaring is dedicated to a specific finite 
11 
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12 
field, which leads to lack of flexibility. Polynomial basis is chosen in this processor 
design, because finite fields with different parameters need to be accommodated. 
C h a p t e r 3 
C r y p t o g r a p h y 
In this chapter, some basic terms used in cryptography are given. Two kinds of 
cryptosystems: the secret-key and public-key cryptosystems are discussed. The 
secret-key cryptographic algorithms: Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) and 
RC5, are introduced. Finally, details of public-key cryptographic algorithms focus­
ing on Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) are presented. 
3.1 Terminology 
Cryptography is the technique of converting data into a secret code for transmission 
over a public network. The original message, known as the plaintext, is converted 
into a coded message, called ciphertext. The process of converting from plaintext to 
ciphertext is called encryption, while the process of converting from ciphertext into 
plaintext is decryption. The theme used for encryption is called the cryptographic 
system or cipher. Encryption algorithms use a key, which is a binary secret number 
typically ranging from 40 to 256 bits in length, to control how the ciphertext is 
produced. At the receiving end, a key is also used to restore the plaintext. Crypto­
graphic systems can be divided into two types according to the number of keys used. 
If both sender and receiver share the same key, the system is known as secret-key, 
symmetric-key, single-key, or conventional cryptography. Conversely, if the sender 
and receiver use different keys, the system is known as public-key, asymmetric-key, 
13 
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or two-key cryptography. The secret-key cryptosystem can further be distinguished 
as block cipher and stream cipher. The block cipher processes the plaintext one 
block of elements at a time and produces the corresponding block of ciphertext 
elements. The stream cipher processes the elements of plaintext continuously and 
produces ciphertext one element at a time. The secret-key algorithms used in this 
thesis are all block ciphers. 
3.2 Secret-key System 
O p p o n e n t attacks 
Plaintext 
X 
Encryption 
Sender 
K 
Secret key 
Ciphertext 
Secure channel 
Decryption 
X 
Plaintext 
R e c e i v e r 
Figure 3.1: Model of secret-key cryptosystem 
The model of secret-key cryptosystem shown in Fig. 3.1 gives the processes for 
encryption and decryption. The encryption algorithm can be written in the following 
form with plaintext X and secret key K as input and ciphertext Y as output. 
Y = EK(X) (3.1) 
From this formula we can see that the ciphertext Y is determined by both the 
encryption algorithm E and the key K. Similarly, the decryption inverts the trans­
formation using the same secret key K and the corresponding decryption algorithm. 
X = DK(Y) 
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The security of the secret-key encryption depends on a strong encryption algorithm 
and the key size. The key is kept secret while the encryption algorithm is open. 
So the design of algorithm requires that the opponents cannot be able to decrypt 
ciphertext without knowing the secret key and to figure out the key even if they 
know a number of pairs of plaintext and ciphertext. 
DES, AES and RC5 are three commonly used secret-key algorithms. 
The main challenge in secret-key cryptosystems lies in how to have the sender 
and receiver share the secret key while keeping it secret without anyone else finding 
out. If the secret keys are in separate physical locations, a trusted third-party such 
as a courier, phone system, or some other transmission medium must be responsible 
for distributing the keys. The generation, transmission and storage of keys are called 
key management. 
3.3 Public-key System 
Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman introduced the concept of public-key cryp­
tography in 1976 in order to solve the key management problem [8]. Public-key 
cryptosystems have two primary themes, encryption and authentication (digital sig­
natures) as illustrated in Fig. 3.2. In the two systems, each participant gets a 
pair of keys, one referred to as the public key KU and the other referred to as the 
private key KR. The public key is published, while the private key is kept secret. 
The need for the sender and receiver to share secret information is eliminated; all 
communications involve only public keys, and no private key is ever transmitted or 
shared. In the encryption theme (Fig. 3.2a), the sender A uses receiver B's public 
key information KU\, to send confidential messages which can only be decrypted 
with B's private key, KR)>. This process can be expressed as follows for the sender 
A: 
Y = EKUb(X) (3.3) 
15 
C h a p t e r 3 C r y p t o g r a p h y 
opponent attacks 
Plaintext 
X 
Encryption 
Sender A 
receiver's public key 
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(a) Encryption 
Decryption 
X 
Plaintext 
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opponent attacks 
Plaintext X Encryption 
Sender A 
Sender's private key 
Ciphertext 
Key Pair Source 
Decryption X Plaintext 
sender's public key 
Receiver B 
(b) Authentication 
Figure 3.2: Model of public-key cryptosystem 
And for the receiver B, the inverted transformation is in the following formula. 
X = DKRb(Y) (3.4) 
In the authentication theme (Fig. 3.2b), the sender A uses his or her private key 
KRa to encrypt the message sent to B and B decrypts using A's public key KUa. 
Because only sender A is in possession of the private key to encrypt the message X, 
the encrypted message Y serves as the digital signature of A. This process can be 
expressed as follows for the sender A: 
Y = EKRa(X) (3.5) 
For the receiver B, the inverted transformation is given in the following formula. 
X = DKUa(Y) (3.6) 
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In a public-key cryptosystem, the private key is always linked mathematically 
to the public key. Therefore, it is always possible to attack a public-key system 
by deriving the private key from the public key. Typically, the defense against this 
is to make the problem of deriving the private key from the public key as difficult 
as possible. For instance, some public-key cryptosystems are designed such that 
deriving the private key from the public key requires the attacker to factor a large 
number. In this case it is computationally infeasible to perform the derivation. This 
is the idea behind the RSA public-key cryptosystem. 
3.4 Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
The security of the public-key cryptography depends on the trap-door one-way func­
tion. A one-way function maps a domain into a range such that every function has 
a unique inverse with the property that it is easy to calculate in one direction and 
infeasible to calculate in the other direction unless certain additional information is 
known. This can be summarized as the following three formulas: 
1. Y = /K(X) easy to calculate, if key K and X are known; 
2. X = fxL(Y) easy to calculate, if key K and Y are known; 
3. X = fxL(Y) infeasible, if Y is known but K is not known. 
Here the private key K is the trap-door. 
Since the introduction of the public-key cryptography concept, only two cryp­
tosystems have been invented, RSA and ECC. The RSA was published in 1978 
by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman [41]. It uses exponentiation modulo a product of 
two large primes to encrypt and decrypt. Its security is based on the difficulty of 
factoring large integers. The introduction of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) 
independently by Neal Koblitz [19] and Victor Miller [31] in the mid' 80s has yielded 
a new family of analogous public-key algorithms. Although mathematically more 
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complex, elliptic curves appear to provide a more efficient way to leverage the dis­
crete logarithm problem, particularly with respect to the key size. 
Because a large number of elliptic curves are in use, it is necessary for an ECC 
processor to be able to handle different elliptic curves and the underlying fields. 
The security of ECC relies on the discrete logarithm problem for the group of 
points on an elliptic curve defined over a finite field. The main advantage of ECC 
over systems based on the multiplicative group is the absence of a sub-exponential-
time algorithm for solving the underlying hard mathematical problem in ECC, i.e. 
the Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem (ECDLP). Consequently, a signif­
icantly smaller parameter can be used in ECC while maintaining the equivalent 
levels of security. It results in a smaller key size, bandwidth, and electrical power, 
and is especially attractive in applications where computational power and space 
are constrained, such as smart cards and wireless devices. 
Good overviews of elliptic curve cryptography can be further found in [28, 20] 
3 . 5 E l l i p t i c C u r v e s o v e r F i n i t e F i e l d s 
Elliptic curve cryptography is based on elliptic curves over finite fields. Two types 
of finite fields have been introduced in Section 2.2, Chapter 2. The Weierstrass 
equations for elliptic curves defined on these two fields GF(P) and GF(2N) are 
described in the following subsections, respectively. 
3 .5 .1 E l l i p t i c C u r v e s o v e r GF(p) 
The elliptic curves over GF(P) (where P is an odd prime and P > 3) is defined by 
the equation 
y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + B (3.7) 
where the parameters a, B € GF(P) and 4a 3 + 276 2 / 0 (mod P). The set of solutions 
(or points) P = (xp, yp) where xp, yp E GF(P), together with a special point O (called 
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the point at infinity) constitute the set Ep(a, b). A finite abelian group (Ep(a, b), +) 
is defined on the set Ep(a, b) with the O acting as its additive identity. According 
to the rule of abelian group, the addition operation in Ep(a,b) for all points P, Q 
G Ep(a, b) in affine coordinate is as follows. 
1. P + 0 = 0 + P = P 
2. If P = (xp, yp), then P + (xp, —yp) = O. The point — P = (xp, —yp) is called 
the negative of P 
3. If P = (xP, yP) and Q = (xQ, yQ) and P ^ ±Q, then R = P + Q = (xR, yR), 
where 
%R — (X2 — xp — XQ) (mod p) (3.8) 
VR = (HXP ~ XR> ~ VP) ( M O D P) (3-9) 
W H E R E A
 = (MODP). 
4. If P = (xP, yP), then R = P + P = 2P= (xR, yR), where 
XR = (A2 — xp — XQ) (mod p) (3.10) 
yR = (X(xp - xR) - yp) (mod p) (3.11) 
where A = ( £ ) (mod p). This operation is referred to as the doubling of a 
point. 
5. Scalar multiplication (or point multiplication) kP is defined as repeated addi­
tion of P to itself k times. 
3.5 .2 E l l i p t i c C u r v e s o v e r GF(2N) 
Elliptic curves over GF(2N) are defined by the equation 
y
2
 +
 Xy = x3 + ax2 + b (3.12) 
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where the parameters a,b G GF(2N). The set of solutions (or points) P — (xp,yp) 
where xp,yp G GF(2N) together with a special point O called the point at infinity 
constitute the set E2n(a,b). A finite abelian group (E2n(a,b), +) is defined on the 
set E2n (a, b) with the a point at infinity O acting as its additive identity. According 
to the rule of abelian group, the addition operation in E2n(a, b) for all points P , Q G 
E2n (a, b) in affine coordinate is as follows. 
1. P + 0 = 0 + P = P. 
2. If P = (xp, yp), then P + (xp, xp + yp) = O. The point - P = (xp, xp + yp) is 
called the negative of P. 
3. If P = (xP, yP) and Q = (xQ, yQ) and P ^ ±Q, then R = P + Q = (xR, yR), 
where 
XR = A2 + A + xp + XQ + a (3.13) 
VR = X{xp + xR) +xR + yP (3.14) 
where A = ( ^ ± ^ ) . 
\XQ+XpI 
4. If P = (xP, yP), then P = P + P = 2 P = (xR, yR), where 
xR = A2 + A + a (3.15) 
yR = \(xP+xR) + xR + yp (3.16) 
where A = (xp + ^). This operation is referred to as the doubling of a point. 
5. Scalar multiplication (or point multiplication) kP is defined as repeated addi­
tion of P to itself k times. 
3 . 6 E C C D o m a i n P a r a m e t e r s 
Some definitions are required before the introduction of ECC domain parameters. 
The order of a point P on an elliptic curve is the smallest positive integer r such 
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that rP = O. kP = IP if and only if k = I (mod r) and k, I €. Zn. The number 
of points of E(GF(Q)), denoted by #E(GF(Q)), is known as the curve order of the 
curve. Hasse's theorem states that #E(GF(Q)) = Q + 1 — T, where |t| < 2^/Q. ECC 
domain parameters over GF(Q) are a septuple: 
T = (Q, FR, a, B, G, n, h) (3.17) 
where Q specifies a prime power (Q = P or Q = 2M, here m is denoted to distinguish the 
power of m from the ECC domain parameter n); FR (field representation) indicates 
the method used for representing field elements in GF(Q); two field elements a and 
B E GF(Q) specify the equation of the elliptic curve E over GF(Q); G = (XG,VG) £ 
Eq(a,B) is the base point on E(GF(Q)); the prime number n is the order of G and 
the integer h is the cofactor h = #E(GF(Q))/n. The ECC key length is defined to 
be the bit-length of n, because n is the primary security parameter. 
3 . 7 K e y G e n e r a t i o n 
An entity A's public and private key pair is associated with a particular set of elliptic 
curve domain parameters (Q, FR, a, B, G, n, h). To generate a key pair, entity A does 
the following: 
1. Select a random or pseudo-random integer d in the interval [1, n-1]. 
2. Compute Q = dG. 
3. A's public key is a point Q in Eq(a, B) and A's private key is an integer d. 
3 . 8 E l l i p t i c C u r v e P r o t o c o l s 
Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH), the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algo­
rithm (ECDSA) and the Elliptic Curve Authenticated Encryption Scheme (ECAES) 
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are three fundamental protocols based on elliptic curves. The ECDH is the elliptic 
curve analog of Difne-Hellman key exchange; the ECDSA is the elliptic version of 
the DSA proposed by Scott Vanstone [52] in 1992; and the ECAES is a variant of 
the ElGamal public-key encryption theme proposed by Abdalla, Bellare and Rog-
away [1] in 1999. Only the simple ECDH is described here and relevant references 
can be referred to for other protocols. Assume participants A and B share the same 
domain parameters D = (q, FR,a,b,G,n,h). The key exchange between A and B 
can be accomplished as follows: 
1. A selects its private key CIA and generates a public key QA according to key 
generation procedure. 
2. B selects its private key dB and generates a public key QB according to key 
generation procedure. 
3. A computes PA = dAQB = {XA,VA) and B computes PB = dBQA = (XB,VB)-
4. Check that PA ^ 0 , P B ^ O. 
5. The shared secret value is k = xA = XB-
3.9 AES Algorithm 
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [49, 35] is the new information protection 
standard defined by the US National Institute for Security Technologies (NIST) to 
replace the previous Data Encryption Standard (DES) to protect certain levels of 
federal information and communications. In 1997, NIST called for a new AES 
algorithm. The Rijndael algorithm was selected as the finalist and published in 
2001. 
AES performs four operations on a 128-bit block of data for a certain number 
of repetitions. All the intermediate results of the 128-bit block as well as the input 
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and the output block are called states. The most intuitive way to understand AES 
operation is to picture each state as a 4 x 4 matrix of bytes which are filled in 
the matrix column by column from the most significant byte (indexed as 0) to the 
least significant byte (indexed as F). At each stage of the transformation between 
plaintext and ciphertext, the block of data is transformed from its current state to 
the next new state, depending on which operation is used. The four operations are 
SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColumns and AddRoundKey. 
The SubBytes operation is a nonlinear substitution that performs on each byte 
of the state using a substitution table (S-box) which contains a permutation of 
all possible 256 8-bit values. The inverse of this operation, InvSubBytes, consists 
of applying the inverse of the affine transformation followed by taking the same 
multiplicative inverse in GF(2S). 
0 4 8 C 0 4 8 C 
1 5 9 D 5 9 D 1 
2 6 A E A E 2 6 
3 7 B F F 3 7 B 
State before ShiftRows State after ShiftRows 
Figure 3.3: ShiftRows operation for encryption in AES algorithm 
The ShiftRows operation (Fig. 3.3) is the cyclic shifting of each row of the 
state to the left over different numbers of bytes (offsets) on encryption, while the 
InvShiftRows shifts to the right on decryption. 
The MixColumns operation treats each column of the state as a four-term poly­
nomial over GF(2S) and transforms each column to a new one by multiplying 
it with a constant polynomial a(x) = {03}x 3 + {01}x2 + {01}a; + {02} modulo 
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x
4
 + 1. The inverse MixColumns operation is a multiplication of each column with 
b(x) = a~\x) = {0B}xs + {0D}x2 + {09}x + {OE} modulo x4 + 1. The trans­
formation can also be written in the following matrix multiplication given a 32-bit 
input word W = W3W2WIWQ where each WI has eight bits. 
(3.18) 
The AddRoundKey operation is a simple logical XOR of the current state with 
a round key that is generated by the key expansion. The XOR operation is its own 
inverse. 
Encryption Decryption 
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01 02 03 01 W2 w'2 
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-^ *»JAddRoundKeyp 
T 
Ciphertext 
Ciphertext 
RoundKeyNi r-——^———i 
—H AddRounKey Initial round 
InvSubBytes 
RoundKeyNi 
Envi 
rr-I..l L_ 
'MixColumns 
, Nornal round 
repeats Nr-1 
times 
EnvMixColumns |—*-|A.ddRoundKey|^  
I InvSubBytes | 
) Final round 
RoundKeyO 0 i 1 1 
—MAddRoundKeyLJ 
i 
1 Ni: Number of round 
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Figure 3.4: AES algorithm flow for encryption/decryption 
In the key expansion algorithm, The initial Nk-word key corresponds to the 
cipher key and all subsequent A^fc-word keys are derived recursively from their re­
spective predecessors [49, 35]. Nk is the number of 32-bit words comprising the 
cipher key, which can be 4, 6 or 8. The same serial Nk-word keys are used in re­
versed order for decryption and all these keys can be derived from the last round of 
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iVrc-word key using the inverse operations. 
3.10 RC5 Algorithm 
RC5 [49, 42, 17] is a fast block cipher designed by Ronald Rivest in 1994. The easy 
implementation and the security of heavily using data-dependent rotations and the 
mixture of different operations make it widely adopted in the area requiring high 
level strength for bulk encryption, such as wireless communications. A particular 
RC5 is exactly designated as RC5-w/r/b, where the variable parameters w, r, b 
denote the word size (in bits), the number of rounds and the length of secret key 
(in bytes), respectively. The allowable values of w are 16, 32 and 64; the allowable 
values of r and b range from 0 to 255. RC5-32/12/16 is commonly chosen. 
There are three routines in RC5: key expansion, encryption, and decryption. 
These routines use three primitive operations (and their inverses): words addition 
modulo 2W (w is the word size parameter), bitwise XOR, and data-dependent left 
rotation of x by y denoted by x « < y. Note that only the log2(w) low-order bits 
of y affect this rotation. In the key-expansion routine, the user-provided secret key 
is expanded to fill a key table whose size depends on the number of rounds. The key 
table is then used in both encryption and decryption. The decryption follows the 
same scheme as encryption except that it requires words subtraction and rotation 
to the right. The description of the encryption algorithm is given in the following 
[42]. 
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I n p u t : Plaintext {A, B], secret key array (S[0], . . . , S[2r], S[2r + 1]) 
O u t p u t : Ciphertext {A, B} 
A = A + 5[0] 
B = B + S[l] 
for i = 1 to r do 
A = ((A © B) « < B) + S[2i] 
B = ((B® A) « < A) + S[2i + 1] 
A l g o r i t h m 1: RC5 encryption algorithm 
RC5 subkey generation is quite complex which generates a subkey array S of 
t — 2r + 2 words from 6-byte secret key K. This includes three algorithm steps. 
First, the secret key array K[0,..., b— 1] in byte is copied into an array L [ 0 , . . . , c— 1] 
in length of c = \b/u] words where u = w/8 is the number of bytes/word. Second, 
array S is initialized using an arithmetic progress modulo 2W determined by the 
predefined magic constants Pw and Qw. At last, a mix in the secret key in three 
passes over the arrays S and L is performed as follows [42]. 
i = j = X = Y = 0 
Do 3* max{2r + 2, c} times: 
X = S[i] = (S[i] + X + Y) « < 3 
i = (i + 1) (mod t) 
Y = L[j] = (L[j] +X + Y) « < (X + Y) 
j = (j + 1) (mod c) 
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3.11 Comparison between Public-key and Secret-
key Cryptosystems 
In this section, the advantages and disadvantages between public-key and secret-
key cryptosystems are summarized. The advantages of public-key cryptosystem 
over secret-key cryptosystem are as follows: 
1. Public-key cryptography has increased security and convenience since private 
keys never need to be transmitted or revealed to anyone. In a secret-key 
cryptosystem, by contrast, the secret keys must be transmitted. 
2. Public-key cryptosystems can provide digital signatures that cannot be repu­
diated. 
The disadvantages of public-key cryptosystem are listed as follows: 
1. Many secret-key encryption algorithms are significantly faster than any cur­
rently available public-key encryption algorithm. 
2. Public-key cryptography may be vulnerable to impersonation, even if users' 
private keys are not available. 
In general, public-key cryptography is best suited for an open multi-user environ­
ment. It is not meant to replace secret-key cryptography, but rather to supplement 
it and to make it more secure. For efficiency reasons, a hybrid cryptosystem is 
used in practice; a key is exchanged using a public-key cipher, and the rest of the 
communication is encrypted using a secret-key algorithm. 
3.12 Summary 
In this chapter, an overview of public-key and secret-key cryptography is presented. 
The public-key Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) and secret-key algorithms of 
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AES and RC5 are discussed. These three algorithms are implemented in the pro­
posed crypto-processor in this thesis. In the final section, comparisons between 
public-key and secret-key cryptography are given. 
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In this chapter, the algorithms used in the ECC are introduced, and the architecture 
of the processor with corresponding instruction set is described. The performance 
evaluation and comparison are given finally. 
The implementation of ECC is more complicated than secret-key cryptosystems 
such as AES and RC5. So a majority of the work in this thesis focuses on the ECC 
design. In ECC, the computation of scalar multiplication kP involves three different 
levels: 
• Selection of scalar multiplication algorithms. These algorithms include the 
double-and-add method using binary representation of k, addition-subtraction 
method using nonadjacent form of k, and Montgomery scalar multiplication. 
Montgomery scalar multiplication is a fast algorithm only for GF(2n). 
• Elliptic arithmetics in different coordinate representations. These coordinates 
include affine coordinates, projective coordinates, Jacobian coordinates used 
in both GF(p) and GF(2n) and Lopez-Dahab [28] projective coordinates used 
only in GF(2n), etc. Different coordinate representations lead to different 
formulae for point addition and point doubling. 
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• Field arithmetics. These include the basis selection, multiplier and squaring 
design, etc. In this thesis, the dual-field multipliers based on Montgomery 
multiplication are designed, which can perform multiplications both in GF(p) 
and GF(2n) using polynomial bases. Furthermore, this multiplier design has 
been extended to implement four independent multiplications over GF(2S) 
used in the secret-key cryptosystems such as AES. 
In this thesis, algorithm combinations between selection of fast scalar multipli­
cation algorithms and selection of coordinate representations are made in order to 
arrive at the best solution. Due to the different characteristics o(GF(p) and GF(2n), 
the combinations are chosen separately. For GF(p), an addition-subtraction method 
using the NonAdjacent Form (NAF) of k in Jacobian projectives is chosen. For 
GF(2n), Montgomery scalar multiplication algorithm in projective coordinates is 
selected. In the finite field arithmetic level, the multiplication over GF(p) and 
GF{2n) are unified using Montgomery multiplication algorithm. 
In the following first two sections, the elliptic arithmetic over GF(p) of point 
addition and point doubling in modified Jacobian coordinates, and scalar multipli­
cation using NAF are introduced. The Montgomery scalar multiplication algorithm 
over GF(2n) in projective coordinates is described in the third section. Due to 
simple formulae for point addition and point doubling, the two parts are described 
in one section. In Section 4.4, the details of Montgomery multiplication algorithm 
over both GF(p) and GF(2n) are introduced. In Section 4.5, the overall architecture 
of the processor is proposed and the details of important common components are 
described. Finally, the instruction set is given and the corresponding programs for 
AES, RC5, and multiplication in GF(p) are listed respectively. In Section 4.6 and 
Section 4.7, the performance evaluation and comparison are given. 
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Coordinate Representation Addition Doubling 
Projective 12 M+2 S 7M+5S 
Jacobian 12 A4+4 S 4M+6S 
Chudnovshky Jacobian 11 A4+3 S 5M+6S 
Modified Jacobian 13 A4+6 S AM+4S 
Table 4.1: Projective coordinate representations over GF(p) 
4 . 1 C o o r d i n a t e R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o f E l l i p t i c C u r v e s 
o v e r GF(p) 
Since inversions are more expensive relative to multiplications, it is more efficient 
to represent points in projective coordinates. The inversion operation is traded for 
more multiplications and other less expensive finite field operations. 
Several projective themes in GF(p) are described in [7]. Table 4.1 compares 
the themes for addition and doubling with respect to the number of multiplications 
M and squarings S in the underlying finite field. The inexpensive field addition 
operation is omitted. In this thesis, the modified Jacobian projective coordinates 
are chosen due to their fastest doubling operation. They are represented internally 
as the quadruple (X, Y, Z, aZ4). The formulae of addition and doubling in the 
modified Jacobian projectives are given as follows [7]. 
Let P = (Xi, Yu Zu aZf), Q = (X2, Y2, Z2, aZ42), and R = P + Q = 
(X3, y 3 , Z3, aZl). The addition formulae of R = P + Q (P ^ ±Q) are the 
following: 
Ul = X1- Zl S2 = Y2- Z\, X3 = -H3 - 2UX • H2 + r 2 , 
U2 = X2 • Zl H = U2- Uu Y3 = -Sx • H3 + r(Ux • H2 - X3), 
Si = Yx- Z3, r = S2~ S i , Z3 = Zx • Z2 • H, aZ4 = aZ4. 
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The doubling formulae of R = 2P are the following: 
S = 4A"i • Y?, X3 = - 2 5 + M 2 , 
U = 8Y4, Y3 = M-(S-X3)- U, 
M = 3Xf + (aZf), Z3 = 2Y1 • Zu aZ\ = 2U • (aZ\). 
4 . 2 E l l i p t i c S c a l a r M u l t i p l i c a t i o n o v e r GF(p) 
There are several methods known to compute kP. The basic method is the binary 
double-and-add method [30, 49] which requires k doublings and k/2 addition on 
average. The addition-subtraction method requires only k/3 additions on average 
with the same number of doubling [48]. It is based on NonAdjacent Form (NAF or 
sparse signed-digit representation) of the coefficient k where the redundant binary 
representation using {-1, 0, 1} is allowed. It is known that every integer has a 
unique NAF with the property that no two consecutive coefficients are nonzero. 
Also, the NAF has the minimum number of nonzero coefficients among all signed-
digit representations, k/3 on average. Here gives an example of NAF: 
NAF{29) = (1,0,0, - 1 , 0 , 1 ) , and 29 = 32 - 4 + 1. (4.1) 
The NAF of an integer is at most one bit longer than its binary expansion. The 
addition-subtraction method requires bit conversion left-to-right. An optimal NAF 
algorithm converted from the most significant bit is listed in Algorithm 2 [16]. 
I n p u t : ( e t , e t _ i , . . . , e i , e 0 ) 
O u t p u t : (dt,dt-i, ...,d0) 
B T « - 0 ; ET 4- 0 ; e_i <- 0 ; e_ 2 «- 0 ; 
for i=t down to 0 do 
BT-I «- [fa + E I - I + e;_ 2 )/2j ; 
di<- ei + bi-i - 2bi ; 
end 
A l g o r i t h m 2: Left-to-right NAF 
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This algorithm can also be expressed as in Table 4.2 (X stands for don't care) 
[16]. Based on this table, a simple hardware speeding-up of NAF is proposed in [16]. 
di (di G {0 , 1, 1}) can be encoded with two one-bit variables {dH,di}- Let {0 —> 
(X, 0)2; 1 —> (0,1)2; -1 —> (1 ,1) 2 }, and after simple logic reduction, bi-i, and 
dL can be expressed as follows. 
' 
bi-i = bi • ri_i • r4-_2 + k • Ti-i + bi • r^2 
< dH = bt 
dL = bi- n-i • + bi-ri + bi-r~i + bi- fj~[ • rJZJ 
v 
The logic diagram based on this equation is illustrated in Fig. 4 .1. Initially, the 
shift-left registers {r,, t v i , r ;_ 2 } are loaded with {0 , r m _ i , r m _ 2 } and the latch is 
reset to logic "0 " . At the end of each iteration, the output du and c? l are used to 
decide the value of the encoded dj. 
d H d L 
Figure 4.1: Hardware speeding-up of NAF 
Given the NAF of n = X ^ L o 0 ^ * , the elliptic scalar multiplication Q = nP is 
performed as follows [28, 48]. 
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T I - L TI-2 K-1 DI 
0 0 0 X 0 0 
0 0 1 0 0 0 
0 0 1 1 1 1 
0 1 0 X 0 1 
1 0 1 X 1 1 
1 1 0 0 0 1 
1 1 0 1 1 0 
1 1 1 X 1 0 
Table 4.2: Left-to-right NAF 
I n p u t : An integer k = (DU D T - I , . . . , D O ) , and a point P G E(GF(q)) 
O u t p u t : Q = kP£ E(GF(q)) 
Set Q <- O ; 
fo r I = T - l D O W N TO 0 do 
Set Q <- 2Q ; 
i f = 1 t h e n 
Set Q <- Q + P ; 
end 
i f ej = — 1 t h e n 
Set Q 4- Q - P ; 
e n d 
e n d 
A l g o r i t h m 3: Addition-subtraction method using NAF 
4 . 3 E l l i p t i c S c a l a r M u l t i p l i c a t i o n o v e r GF(2n) 
A new scalar multiplication algorithm that was first proposed by Montgomery [33] 
and then modified by Lopez and Dahab [27] proves to be the best algorithm for 
elliptic scalar multiplication in GF(2n). It is based on the binary expansion of k 
and the observation that the x-coordinate of the sum of two points whose difference 
is known can be computed in terms of the x-coordinates of the involved points. It 
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can be expressed in Algorithm 4. 
I n p u t : An integer k > 0, and a point P € E(GF(2n)) 
O u t p u t : Q = kP€ E(GF(2n)) 
Set k <r- (kt-i, kT-2, • • •, /ci, k0)2 ; 
Set A <- P , P 2 «- 2P ; 
fo r «=t-jS down to 0 do 
i f hi = 1 t h e n 
Set Pi <- Pi + P 2 , P 2 ^ 2P 2 ; 
else 
Set P 2 ^- Pi + P 2 , Pi 2Pi ; 
end 
end 
Q = Pi; 
A l g o r i t h m 4: The basic Montgomery scalar multiplication 
As in GF(p), projective coordinates (X, Y, Z) are represented in order to avoid 
expensive inversions by x = X / Z and y=Y/Z from affine coordinates (x, y). The 
Montgomery scalar multiplication in projective coordinates is listed in Algorithm 5. 
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I n p u t : An integer k > 0, and a point P e E(GF(2n)) 
O u t p u t : Q = kPe E(GF(2n)) 
i f k=0 or x=0 t h e n 
output (0,0) and stop ; 
e n d 
Set k 4 - (kt-i, kT-2, • • •, h, k0) ; 
Set Xx 4- x, Zi 4- 1, X2 4- x4 + b, Z2 4- x 2 ; 
f o r i—t-2 down to 0 d o 
i f ki = 1 t h e n 
Z 3 f - ( X ! • Z2 + X2 • Zx)\ X34-x-Z3 + (Xx- Z2) • (X2 • Zx) ; 
Z4 4— Z2 ' X2, X4 4— X2 - f - b • Z2 ; 
• ^ l -^3) Xx 4— X3, Z2 4— Z 4 , ; 
e l s e 
Z3 4- (xx -Z2 + X2- Zx)\ X34-x-Z3 + (Xx- Z2) • (X2 • Zx) ; 
ZA 4- Z\ • AT2, X44-Xf + b-Zf ; 
Zx 4— Z4, Xx 4— X4, Z2 4— Z 3 , X2 4— X3 ; 
e n d 
e n d 
return (The affine coordinates converted from projective coordinates of Q) ; 
A l g o r i t h m 5 : The Montgomery scalar multiplication algorithm using projective 
coordinates 
The y-coordinates of kP can be computed from the x-coordinates of points involved 
in the last iteration in Algorithm 5, which is shown as follows. 
if Zx = 0 then output (0,0) 
ifZ2 = 0 then output (x, x + y) 
Xx 
Xk =
 Yx 
(XX (%+x)(% + x)+x2 + y 
yk = — + x ) • - 1 2- + y 
Zx x 
Using projective coordinates, Montgomery scalar multiplication requires 6 \log2(k)\ + 
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9 multiplications, b[log2(k)\ + 3 squarings, 3[log2(k)\ + 7 additions and 1 multi­
plicative inverse. 
4 . 4 M o n t g o m e r y M u l t i p l i c a t i o n 
Montgomery multiplication was first proposed by Montgomery in 1985 [32], as an ef­
ficient method for doing modular multiplication in prime fields GF(p). This method 
was extended to the binary finite field GF(2m) by K o q and Acar in [21]. Several 
papers [12, 43, 9] have explored the similarity of hardware design between Mont­
gomery multiplications in GF(p) and GF(2m) and proposed unified or dual-field 
multipliers based on the Montgomery multiplication algorithm. 
4 . 4 . 1 M o n t g o m e r y M u l t i p l i c a t i o n o v e r GF(p) 
Given two integers A and B, and the prime number p, the Montgomery multiplica­
tion algorithm in GF(p) computes 
where R = 2 m and 0 < A, B < p < R and p is an m-bit number. Before using 
Montgomery multiplication, the field element should be transformed into Mont­
gomery domain by using the formula A = A • R (mod p) for A G GF(p). For any 
two elements in the Montgomery domain A and B, the result using equation 4.2 is 
still in the Montgomery domain. 
C = A • B • R'1 (mod p) = (A-R)-(B-R)-R~l = C-R (mod p) (4.3) 
The transformation operations between the two domains can be performed using 
the MonMul function as follows. 
C = MonMul(A, B) = A - B • R (mod p) (4.2) 
A = MonMul(A, R2) = A • R2 • R~l = A • R (mod p) 
C = MonMul(C, 1) = C • R • R~l = C (mod p) 
(4.4) 
(4.5) 
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The key idea of the Montgomery multiplication algorithm is to add an appropriate 
multiple of p to make the lowest m bits of A • B equal to 0. The addition operation 
does not influence the equation 4.2 due to its modulo p arithmetic. In the following, 
we assume that the operation numbers have already been transformed to Mont­
gomery domain and the overlines are omitted. For Montgomery reduction algorithm, 
an additional value N' is needed which satisfies the property R • R~l — N • N' = 1. 
The integer R~l and N' can be computed by the extended Euclidean algorithm. 
The Montgomery multiplication algorithm is given below: 
I n p u t : A, B, p (0 < A,B < p) 
O u t p u t : C = AB2-mmod p 
1. T = A-B ; 
2. M = T-N' mod 2m ; 
3. C = (T + M-p)/2m ; 
4. if C > p then C = C - p ; 
For multiple-precision multiplication, the operands of m-bit length should be 
divided into s blocks of words (m = s x w) in the form as A = (as-i, • •., a i , oo), 
where w is the word size. This can also be expressed as follows: 
If one operand is in multiple-precision, while other operands are still in full-
precision, the Montgomery multiplication algorithm is shown as Algorithm 6. In 
this algorithm, the division of 2W is trivial because the least significant word of the 
dividend is zero. This can be proved by the following argument: 
A = a •s-l 2 « ( « - i ) + . . . + a i 2 ^ + a o (4.6) 
c 0 + dj&o + UP mod 2' 
- c 0 + ciibo + (c 0 + ciibo)(-p l)p mod 2' 
Co + aj&o - ( c o + a>ibo) mod 2' 
= 0 
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I N P U T : A = (as-i,... ,a,i,ao), B, p, q = —p 1 mod 2W = —pQ 1 mod 2W 
O U T P U T : C = AB2~m mod p 
C = 0 ; 
FOR (i=0 to s-1) DO 
U = (c 0 + aj6o)? mod 2^ ; 
C = (C + aiB + tiP)/2w ; 
END 
IF (C > p) THEN 
C=C-p ; 
END 
ALGORITHM 6: Word level full precision Montgomery multiplication 
If all the operands are in multiple-precision form, the Montgomery multiplication 
is listed in Algorithm 7 based on the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning (CIOS) 
Method [22]. 
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I n p u t : A = ( a a _ i , . . . , a i , o o ) , B = . . . , & i , M , P = (Ps-i, • • • . P i . P o ) , 
g = — P q - 1 mod 2 W 
O u t p u t : i = A B 2 _ m mod p 
f o r i = 0 i o s-1 d o 
C = 0 ; 
f o r j = 0 to s-1 d o 
(C, 5) = t[j] + o[j] x b[i\ + C ; 
= S ; 
e n d 
(C,S) = t[s] + C; t[s]=S;; 
m = t[0] x q mod 2™ ; 
f o r j=0 to s-1 d o 
(C, S) = t[j] + m x + C ; 
i f j ^ 0 t h e n 
t[j - 1] = 5 ; 
e n d 
e n d 
(C7, S) = t[8] + C ; 
t[s - 1] = S; t[s] = C ; 
i f t > p t h e n 
t = t-p; 
e n d 
e n d 
A l g o r i t h m 7 : Word level word level Montgomery multiplication over GF(p) 
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I N P U T : A = ( o a _ i , . . . , O i , a 0 ) , p = (ps-u • • • ,Pi,Po), Q = "Po" 1 m o d 2™ 
O U T P U T : t = AB2~m mod p 
FOR i=0 5 - i DO 
(7 = 0 ; 
(C, 5) = t[i\ + a[i] x o[i] + C; = 5 ; 
FOR j—i+1 to s-1 DO 
(C, 5) = i[j] + 2 x a[j] x a[{\ + C; t[j] = S ; 
END 
(C, 5) = t[s] + C ; 
m = t[0] x g mod 2W ; 
FOR ;'=0 to s-1 DO 
(C,S) = t [ j ] + m x p [ j ] + C ; 
IF j ^ 0 THEN 
t[j - 1] = S ; 
END 
END 
(C, 5) = + C ; 
t[s - 1] = 5; t[s] = C ; 
IF t > p THEN 
t = t-p-
END 
END 
ALGORITHM 8: Montgomery squaring over GF(p) 
4 . 4 . 2 M O N T G O M E R Y M U L T I P L I C A T I O N O V E R GF(2N) 
The Montgomery multiplication in GF(2n) using the polynomial basis is very similar 
to the one in GF(p) [22]. The Montgomery multiplication of A(x) and B(x) with 
product C(x) is given as 
C(x) = A(x) • B(x) • R(x)~l (mod p(x)) (4.7) 
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where R(x) — xm instead of R = 2 m as compared with equation 4.2. Furthermore, 
the representation of the elements of GF(p) and GF(2n) are the same. An example 
in [44] is given as follows. 
The elements of GF(7) for p = 7 and the elements of GF(23) for p(x) = xz + 
x + 1 are represented as GF(7) = {000,001,010,011,100,101,110} and GF(2Z) = 
{000,001,010,011,100,101,110, 111}, respectively. 
Similarly, the domain transformations are required: before Montgomery multiplica­
tion, the operands should be transformed into Montgomery domain and the com­
puting result should be transformed back. The transformations are accomplished as 
follows: 
A = MolMul(A, R2) = A(x) • R2(x) • R~l(x) = A(x) • B(x) (mod p(x)) 
B = MolMul(B, R2) = B(x) • R2(x) • R~l(x) = A(x) • B(x) (mod p(x)) 
C = MolMul(C, 1) = C(x) • R(x) • R~l(x) = C(x) (mod p(x)) 
However, the operations in GF(2m) are much simpler without considering carry 
propagations. 
The multiple-precision Montgomery multiplication algorithm for multiplication 
and squaring can be written based on the Coarsely Integrated Operand Scanning 
(CIOS) Method [22] as follows: 
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I N P U T : A(x) = (a,_i , • • • , aX) a 0 ) , B(x) = (6,_ x , • • • , bx, 6 0), 
P(x) = (Ps-u • • • ,PuPo), q{x) = p(x)~l mod a;w = p 0 ( ^ ) _ 1 mod x 
O U T P U T : t(x) = A(x)B(x) mod p(x) 
FOR i=0 to s-1 DO 
C = 0 ; 
FOR j=0 to s-1 DO 
( C , S) = + a[j] x b\i] + C ; t[j] = 5 ; 
END 
( C , S) = t[s] + C ; 
m = t[0] x n'[0] mod x w ; 
FOR j = 0 io 5 - i DO 
( C , 5 ) = tb1 + M X N [ ) 1 + C ; 
IF j ± 0 THEN 
t[j -1} = S; 
END 
END 
( C , S) = t[s] + C ; 
t[s - 1] = 5 ; = C ; 
END 
ALGORITHM 9 : Montgomery multiplication over GF(2n) 
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I N P U T : A(x) = a a _ i , . . . , au a 0 ) , p(x) = . . . , P i , p 0 ) , 9 = p{x) 1 mod 
^ = PQ{X)~1 mod a;1" 
O U T P U T : = A(x)B(x) mod 
FOR i=0 to s-1 DO 
C = 0 ; 
(C, 5) = + o[i] x o[i] + C ; 
t[i\ = S ; 
FOR j=i+l to s-1 DO 
(C,S) = t[j] + 2xa[j]xa[i\+C ; 
t[j] = S ; 
END 
(C, S) = t[s] + C ; 
m -1[0] x p'[0] mod a;1" ; 
FOR j=0 to s-1 DO 
(C,S) = t[j] + mxn[j]+C ; 
IF ; V 0 THEN 
t[j - 1 ] = s • 
END 
END 
(C, S) = t[s] + C ; 
t[s - 1] = S; t[s] = C ; 
END 
ALGORITHM 1 0 : Montgomery squaring over GF(2n) 
4 . 5 A r c h i t e c t u r e o f t h e H y b r i d P r o c e s s o r 
The common arithmetic components in the three algorithms: ECC, AES, and RC5 
are extracted as shown in Table 4.3. As the most important arithmetic component, 
a novel multiplier of 32 by 32 bits is proposed to perform multiplication over GF(p) 
and GF(2n) in the ECC, and four independent multiplications over GF(28) in the 
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components AES RC5 ECC over GF(p) ECC over GF(2n) 
multiplication V V V 
barrel shifter V V V 
adder/subtracter V V 
XOR V V 
Table 4.3: The core components in different cryptographic algorithms 
MixColumns operation of AES. An adder/subtracter is used for the modular ad­
dition/subtraction in RC5 and over GF(p) in ECC. In addition, a barrel shifter is 
embedded for data-dependent rotation in RC5. This barrel shifter can also be used 
for bit-shifts of parameter k in scalar multiplication kP over GF(p) and GF(2n). 
In the following, the data path of the processor is described and followed by the 
details of core arithmetic components and the instruction set. 
4 . 5 . 1 D a t a P a t h 
The main data path is 32-bit wide as shown in Fig. 4.2. The long operands of the 
ECC algorithm need to be broken up into multiple smaller words, and the arithmetic 
operations such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication, are implemented as 
multiple-precision operations [21]. The 32-bit data path is chosen considering that 
the word length in RC5 is 32-bit, and AES can also be processed in 32-bit processors. 
The two dual-port memories, which both have the capacity of 256 x 32 bits, are used 
not only for passing parameters between the cryptographic processor and the host, 
but also for operands. The parameters for ECC or the expanded subkey array 
for secret-key cryptography are loaded into the dual-port RAMs from I /O ports. 
The operands of many instructions come from the dual-port RAMs. The formula 
of multiplication-accumulator operation is shown as (CA, SUM) = srcQ x src l + 
src2 + CA, where CA is the carry vector, SUM is the sum vector, and srcO, srcl, 
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srcl are the three source operands which are accessed directly from the two dual-
port RAMs with the ports doutal, doutbl or douta2. The data in the dual-port 
RAMs can also be routed to register A through ports doutal or doutb2. The results 
of barrel shifter, XOR and addition/subtraction operations are stored to register A, 
whereas the results of multiplications for ECC are written back to the dual-port 
RAMs. 
In order to accommodate the eight-bit operations used in secret-key crypto­
graphic algorithms, an eight-bit data path is also provided as shown in Fig. 4.3. 
The register A comprises of four eight-bit registers, i.e. AO, Al , A2, and A3. The 
sufficient Block RAMs provided by Xilinx FPGA devices are utilized to store the 
constants of the S-box and inverse S-box lookup tables operation used in AES algo­
rithm. The ROM of 512 x 8 bits is implemented by Block RAMs. The register file is 
composed of 32 eight-bit registers, of which four registers hold the indirect address 
for the dual-port RAMs and seven registers are used for the polynomial reduction 
for multiplication over GF(2S). The result of the multiplication over GF(28) is 
transmitted into A passing through multipliers as a 32-bit operation (Fig. 4.2) or 
the four independent bytes are XORed and the result is then stored into one of A3, 
A2, Al , AO as an eight-bit operation (Fig. 4.3). For the MixColumns operation 
in AES, each element in the right column of the matrix in Equation 3.18 needs 
eight-bit XOR operations between the results of four eight-bit multiplications. For 
example, w3 = ({02} • w3) © ({03} • w2) © ({01} • wi) © ({01} • w0). This special 
operation for MixColumns is supported directly in the design. 
4 . 5 . 2 M u l t i p l i e r D e s i g n 
Based on the multiple-precision multipliers for ECC over GF(p) and GF(2n) [43, 9], 
a novel multiplier is proposed which is extended to perform not only the multipli­
cations over GF(p) and GF(2n), but also four parallel eight-bit multiplications 
over GF(28) that are used in the secret-key cryptosystems such as AES. The block 
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Figure 4.2: The data path of the architecture: 32-bit part 
diagram of the multiplier is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. It can perform operation 
(CA, SUM) = srcO x src l + src2 + CA for ECC over GF(p) and GF(2n), and 
operation MuLGF8 — srcO x src l with 32-bit operands. The presented multi­
plier uses parallel tree multiplier which is based on the integer multiplier design. 
Multiplications presented in this thesis consist of three main stages [51]: 
• Partial product generation. It uses 32 x 32 AND gates to generate the partial 
product bits. 
• Partial product reduction. It uses a Carry-Save Adder (CSA) tree to reduce 
the partial products in a redundant carry/sum representation. 
• Final carry-propagate addition. It uses Carry-Propagate Adders (CPA) to add 
the sum and carry vectors and produces the final product. 
Carry-Save Adders are implemented by Half Adders (HA) and Full Adders (FA). 
The formulae of the HA and FA used in the tree multiplier are shown in Equation 
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Mol_GF8 [23:16] 
Mul_GFpi:24] Mul_GF8[15:8] Mul_GF8[7:0] 
Figure 4.3: The data path of the architecture: eight-bit part 
4.8 and 4.9. We can see that the sums are only XOR operation. 
Sk — &k © h (4.8) 
and 
(4.9) sk = a>k © bk © Cfe 
= dk • bk + a,k • Ck + b]c • Ck 
The multiplication over GF{2n) involves only two stages that are partial product 
generation and partial product reduction, since no carry-propagations are consid­
ered. The partial product reduction performs only XOR operations between the 
same digit position. From the equations for the HA and FA, it can be seen that the 
sum is exactly the XOR operation required by multiplication over GF{2n). So it 
is possible to combine the multiplication over GF(2n) with the one over GF(p) in 
such a way that the sum bits are added first and the carry bits c^+i are added as 
late as possible in the partial product reduction. The multiplication over GF(2n) is 
just a special case of the one over GF(p) without considering the carry-propagation. 
Finally, the product for GF(2n) is summed up with the reduced carry-bits in the 
final stages and the product for GF(p) is obtained by the carry-lookahead adder. 
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srcO 
src2 
partial product 
matrix 
CSA reduction tree, CPA, 
and polynomial reduction 
CA SUM Mul GF8 
Figure 4.4: The block diagram of multiple-precision multifunction multiplier 
The procedure is illustrated in Fig. 4.5. 
In the secret-key cryptography, the multiplications over GF(28) are required by 
the MixColumns operation in AES. The proposed multiplier is further extended to 
perform four independent multiplications over GF{28). The 32-bit inputs srcO and 
srcl are referred to as the concatenation of four eight-bit elements over GF(28), re­
spectively. The four multiplications are s rc0[31 . . . 24] x s r c l [ 3 1 . . . 24], src0[23 . . . 16] x 
s rc l [23 . . .16], src0[15. . .8] x srcl[15 . . . 8], and src0[7. . .0] x s r c l [ 7 . . .0]. The dot 
diagram of partial product generation for the four eight-bit multiplications is illus­
trated as hollow dots in Fig. 4.6. The multiplication over GF(28) can be viewed as 
a special case of multiplication over GF(2n). The four multiplications of eight-bit 
by eight-bit over GF(28) are performed first. This result is used in the next XOR 
operations in the same digit positions in the computation of GF(2n). The results of 
the four 15-bit products over GF(28) are ready after the third stage, and the product 
over GF(2n) is ready after the fifth stage. The four 15-bit results obtained from the 
partial product reduction need modulo the irreducible polynomial f ( x ) to reduce to 
elements over GF{28) as shown in Fig. 4.5. For the AES algorithm, this irreducible 
polynomial is f ( x ) = XS + x4 + x3 + x + 1. The reduction method is illustrated as 
follows. Suppose the product is a(x) = a u x 1 4 + a ^ x 1 3 . . . + a 8 x 8 + ciyx7 + . . . + aoX°, 
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Figure 4.5: Partial product reduction, CPA and polynomial reduction 
and let 
= x
8
 mod f(x) -= x4 + x3 + X + 1 
= x
9
 mod f[x) -= (x4 + x3 + x + l)x = x5 + x4 + x2 + x 
h(x) = x10 mod f(x) = (x4 + X3 + x + l)x2 = x6 + x5 + x3 + x2 
b4(x) = x 1 1 mod f(x) = (x4 + x3 + x + l)x3 = x7 + xe + x4 + x3 
b5(x) = x12 mod f(x) = (x4 + x3 + x + l)x4 = x7 + x5 + x3 + X + 1 
b6(x) = x13 mod fix) = (x4 + x3 + x + l)x5 = x5 + x4 + x3 + x 
b7(x) = x14 mod f(x) = (x4 + x3 + x + l)xe = x7 + x4 + x3 + x 
Then a(x) is reduced by a(x)' = a(x) mod f(x) = Yli=iA7+i ' bi(x) + J2i=oaixZ-
Parameters b\ to b7 are kept in registers since they are constants once the irreducible 
polynomial is fixed. It is flexible in that the parameters of 61 to b7 can be changed 
according to different applications. 
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Figure 4.6: The dot diagram for partial product matrix of 32 — bit x 32 — bit mul­
tiplication 
The CSA utilizes tree topologies of adders so that the carry-out from one adder 
is not connected to the carry-in of the next one. The Reduced Area (RA) multiplier 
is used in the design instead of Wallace tree [43]. It can obtain the maximum 
reduction in the number of partial product bits in each reduction stage and minimize 
the total hardware area. Its reduction scheme differs from Wallace and Dadda's 
methods in that the maximum number of FAs is utilized as early as possible, and 
HAs are used only in two cases: (1) to reduce the number of bits in a column to 
the number of bits specified by Dadda sequence; (2) to reduce the rightmost column 
containing exactly two bits [51]. The RA multiplier is more flexible to be used in 
the partial product reductions for multiplications over GF(p), GF(2n), and GF(28). 
This design requires only nine reduction stages, the same as the 32-bit Wallace tree 
and Dadda tree multipliers that perform only multiplication over GF(p). It means 
that the the implementation of multiplications over GF(2n) and GF(28) with integer 
multiplication over GF(p) does not produce additional delay. 
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dalajn[7] 
dala_jn[6] 
datajn[5] 
d*E\_out[7] 
dat^ out[6] 
dat^ _out[5] 
Figure 4.7: Example of an 8-bit barrel shifter 
4 . 5 . 3 B A R R E L S H I F T E R 
The proposed multiplexer-based barrel shifter performs only circular shift operation. 
It is a combinational logic circuit design with 32-bit data inputs, 32-bit data outputs, 
and a five-bit control input to specify the amount of circular shift (0 to 31 bits), 
and a one-bit control signal to indicate the direction of circular shift (left or right). 
The circuit consists of five stages of 2:1 multiplexers, with one multiplexer per bit of 
the input data. The selection signals of all multiplexers in each stage are connected 
together. When shft[0]=l, the first stage of multiplexers performs a shift by one 
bit; when shft[0]=0, it does not perform any shift. Similarly, the second, third, 
fourth, and fifth stage perform a shift by 2, 4, 8, and 16 bits respectively. Due 
to the cascade, all shift amounts (0 to 31) can be performed. For right shift, the 
signal shft[4:0] is complemented, which means the shifter performs left shift with 
a complementary amount of bits used for right shift. An example of an eight-bit 
barrel shifter is shown in Fig. 4.7. 
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a31 % 
Figure 4.8: Adder/subtracter 
4 .5 .4 A d d e r / S u b t r a c t e r 
The adder/subtracter illustrated in 4.8 is a 32-bit carry look-ahead adder with data 
inputs A and B, one output S, and a carry bit C. To perform subtraction, the 
adder is utilized to add the two's complement of the input B, i.e. A-B=A+(-B) . 
The exclusive OR gates together with the signal sub are used to perform the two's 
complement when sub= l . For multiple-precision addition, the signal sub is set to 
"0"; it passes through the multiplexor in the first iteration and the carry bit C passes 
in the rest of iterations. Similarly, for multiple-precision subtraction, the signal sub 
is set to " 1 " ; it passes through the multiplexor in the first iteration and C in the 
rest of iterations. 
4 .5 .5 I n s t r u c t i o n Se t 
Table 4.4 contains the complete instruction set. Instructions fall into three cate­
gories: arithmetic instructions, memory instructions, and control instructions. 
The implementation of RC5 is quite simple, just following the Algorithm 1 in 
Chapter 3. Table 4.5 lists the source codes for RC5. The implementation of AES is 
not so straightforward. The S-box operations are implemented by 16 look-up table. 
The MixColumns operation is performed by 16 multiplication according to Equation 
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instruction explanation clock 
cycles 
MuLGFP srcO, srcl, src2, dst multiplication over GF(p) 
dst = srcO x s rc l + src2 + C 
5 
MuLGF2N srcO, srcl, src2, dst multiplication over GF(2n) 
dst = srcO x s rc l © src2 © C 
5 
Mul_GF8 srcO, srcl, A four multiplications over GF(2&) 4 
MixColumns srcO, srcl, dst multiplications over GF(28) and the 
result is XORed between the four bytes 
4 
SQUR.GFP srcO, srcl, dst squaring over GF(p) 
dst = srcO x srcO + src l + C 
5 
SQUR-GF2N srcO, srcl, dst squaring over GF(2n) 
dst = srcO x srcO © srcl © C 
5 
SHFT barrel shift 4 
XOR exclusive OR 4 
ADD srcO, srcl, dst addition 5 
SUB srcO, srcl, dst subtraction 5 
LDA load into A (32-bit) 4 
or load into AO, Al , A2, A3 (eight-bit) 3 
STR store constant or A0,A1,A2,A3 
CO
 
or store A or CA to dual-port RAM 4 
LKUP lookup table 4 
BRNZ bit, addr branch to addr if test bit is set 3/4 
BRLE #const , addr branch to addr if index < #const 3/4 
CLR clear the carry bit of adder/subtracter 
or clear the carry register of multiplier 3 
NOP CO
 
Table 4.4: Instruction set 
3.18. The ShiftRows operation spans throughout the entire 128-bit. The 16 bytes 
are first put into 16 eight-bit general registers, and read back in the order as shown 
in Fig. 3.3. The codes for one round of AES are shown in Table 4.15. Table 4.6 
gives the source codes for Montgomery multiplication over GF(p) which is based on 
the Algorithm 7 in Section 4.4.1. 
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L£ 0 =A+S[0] 
RE0=B+S[1] 
STR # 0 , RegJndexl 
ADD *AR0, *AR2+, *BR0 
ADD *AR1, *AR2+, *BR1 
for i = l to r do 
temp = LEi-i © REt_i 
temp = temp « < RE^i 
LEi = temp + S[2 x i] 
temp = LEi © REi-i 
temp = temp « < LEi 
REt = temp + S[2 x i + 1] 
J l : 
XOR *BR0, *BR1, A 
SHFT A, *BR1, A 
ADD A, *AR2, *BR0 
XOR A, *BR0, A 
SHFT A, *BR0, A 
ADD A, *AR2+, *BR1 
BRLE # 1 1 , J l 
Table 4.5: Codes for RC5 
4 . 6 P e r f o r m a n c e E v a l u a t i o n 
The cryptographic processor was prototyped in a Xilinx Virtex-II xc2v3000-5bf957 
FPGA using Verilog Hardware Description Language (Verilog HDL). It works at 
the maximum frequency of 60.15MHz. 
Table 4.7 lists the resources used by different operation components. The re­
sources contain 4-input look-up tables (LUTs), slices and Block RAMs. From the 
table, it can be seen that the multiplier occupies most of the hardware resources. 
The implementation of ECC relies heavily on the multiplication, so consuming more 
resources on the design of parallel multiplier is worthwhile. Block RAMs are utilized 
to implement the look-up tables for S-box operation in AES, and the two dual-port 
RAMs. 
The performance of secret-key and public-key cryptosystems is illustrated in 
Table 4.8. When evaluating the time used for scalar multiplication kP in ECC over 
GF(2n), let k « 2 n ; for kP over GF(p), let k « /, where / is the order of the field 
GF(p). 
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For(i=0 to s-1) STR # 0 , Reg-indexl 
C=0; J l : CLR C 
For(j=0 to s-1) J2: 
(C,S)=t[j]+a[j] x b[i]+C; MuLGFP *AR0+, *AR1, *AR2+ 
t[J]=S; BRLE s-1, J2 
(C,S)=t[s]+C; t[s]=S; MuLGFP *AR0+, *AR1+, *AR2+ 
m=t[0] x q mod W; MuLGFP *AR0, *AR2, *AR1 
For(j=0 to s-1) 
(C,S)=t[j]+m x p[j]+C; MuLGFP *AR0+, *AR1, *AR2+ 
if(j # 0) STR # 1 , RegJndex2 
tp- l ]=S; J3: MuLGFP *AR0+, *AR1, *AR2+ 
(C,S)=t[s]+C; BRLE # 8 - 1 , J3 
t[s-l]=S; STR C, *AR2 
t[s]=C; BRLE # s - l , J l 
If(t > p) STR # 0 , Reg-indexl 
t= t -p ; CLR Add_C 
J4: SUBC *AR0+, *AR1+, *AR2+ 
BRLE # s - l , J4 
Table 4.6: Codes for Montgomery multiplication over GF(p) 
Components Slices BRAM 
Multiplier 2005 
Barrel shifter 95 _ 
Adder / subtracter 91 
NAF 2 
Full design 2479 67 
Table 4.7: Usage of FPGA resources 
4 . 7 P e r f o r m a n c e C o m p a r i s o n 
The comparison with other work for RC5 is shown in Table 4.9. The throughput of 
RC5-32/12/16 in this design achieves 10.7 Mbit/s on encryption/decryption. The 
work in [40] implements RC5-32/12/16 for prototype of small sensor devices using 
an eight-bit processor with its throughput of only 4.8 Kbit/s . The throughput of a 
software implementation of RC5-32/12/8 in [45] on a Pentium 266MMX can reach 
11.4 Mbit/s. This means that the performance of the proposed hybrid processor 
competes with that of the Pentium 266MMX which uses an advanced superscalar 
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Algorithms RC5 AES ECC over O F ( 2 1 4 6 ) ECC over GF(p) 
192-bit 
Throughput (Mbit/s) 10.7 2.0 - -
scalar multiplication (ms) - - 12 28.4 
Table 4.8: The performance for different cryptosystems 
Performance parameters Perrig et al. [40] Sesstions [45] This work 
Throughput (Mbit/s) 4.8 Kbit /s 11.4 Mbit /s 10.7 Mbit /s 
Table 4.9: The performance comparison for RC5 
architecture. 
Performance parameters Atasu et al. [3] This work 
Throughput (Mbit/s) Encryption 0.5 2.0 
Decryption 0.29 2.0 
Table 4.10: The performance comparison for AES 
Atasu et al. [3] implements AES on ARM-based platforms, which are 32-bit 
embedded Reduced Instruction Set Computer (RISC) microprocessors. They also 
use the look-up table method for S-box operations. The throughputs are much lower 
than those in this design for both encryption and decryption. 
Weimerskirch et al. [54] implements the elliptic curve over GF(2163) on a Palm 
OS device with a 32-bit processor. The time for point multiplication using Mont­
gomery scalar multiplication is 2.73s. The work in [27] proposed the new Mont­
gomery scalar multiplication algorithms and reported results obtained from a soft­
ware implementation using a Sun UltraSPARC 300 MHz. From the Table 4.11, it 
can be seen that the scalar multiplication in this thesis is better than [54, 27]. Kim 
and Lee [18] also propose a secret-key and public-key crypto-processor. It can per­
form AES, SEED and ECC. The design implements each cryptographic algorithm 
separately using each dedicated cryptographic block, which uses 4725 slices for AES 
and ECC. However, the common arithmetic components are extracted and shared 
in this design, and only 2479 slices are required in total, which is only the 1/2 of 
that used in [18]. In addition, the work in [18] can only perform on the fixed elliptic 
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Implementations Scalar 
multiplication 
Field Platform Frequency 
(MHz)' 
This work 12 (ms) GF(2146) Xilinx 
xc2v3000-5bf957 
60.15 
Weimerskirch 
et al. [54] 
2.73 (s) GF(2163) Palm OS 16 
Lopez et al. [27] 13.5 (ms) GF(216'6) UltraSPARC 300 (software) 
Kim et al. [18] 7.28 (ms) GF{2146) FPGA 50 
Table 4.11: The scalar multiplication comparison for ECC over GF(2n) 
Logic size 
(slices) 
Implementations AES ECC Total 
This work 2479 
Kim et al.[18 1689 3036 4725 
Table 4.12: The hardware comparison for ECC over GF(2n) 
curve GF(2146), whereas the design in this thesis is much flexible, which performs 
ECC not only over GF(2n), but also over GF(p). The prime number of p of GF(p) 
and the irreducible polynomial of GF(2n) can be changed easily to meet different 
requirements. It increases the security and reduces the users' cost to easily adopt 
more secure elliptic curves without changing the hardware. 
Implementations Scalar 
multiplication 
Field Platform Frequency 
(MHz) ' 
This work 28.4 (ms) GF(p) 192-bit FPGA 60.15 
Xu et al. [55] 30 ms GF(2im - 2 6 4 - 1) ASIC 50 
Table 4.13: The performance comparison for ECC over GF(p) 
The performance comparison with other work of ECC over GF(p) is shown in 
Table 4.13. Note that the prime field in [55] is fixed for GF{2in - 2 6 4 - 1) and for 
specific elliptic curve with a = p — 3, which lacks flexibility. 
4.8 Future Improvement 
In the future, efforts will be made to speed up the proposed processor by the pipeline 
technique. The number of clock cycles of each instruction will be reduced (Table 
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4.14), and the maximum frequency could reach around 90~120 MHz. It is estimated 
that the time for the scalar multiplication over GF(2146) would be 3.4~4.6 ms. 
instruction explanation clock 
cycles 
MuLGFP srcO, srcl, $rc2, dst multiplication over GF(p) 
dst = srcO x srcl + src2 + C 
3 
Mul_GF2N srcO, s rc l , src2, dst multiplication over GF(2n) 
dst — srcO x srcl © src2 © C 
3 
Mul_GF8 srcO, s rc l , A four multiplications over GF{28) 2 
MixColumns srcO, s rc l , dst multiplications over GF(28) and the 
result is XORed between the four bytes 
2 
SQUR-GFP srcO, s rc l , dst squaring over GF(p) 
dst = srcO x srcO + srcl + C 
3 
SQUR-GF2N srcO, s rc l , dst squaring over GF(2n) 
dst = srcO x srcO © srcl © C 
3 
SHFT barrel shift 2 
XOR exclusive OR 2 
ADD srcO, s rc l , dst addition 3 
SUB srcO, s rc l , dst subtraction 3 
LDA load into A (32-bit) 2 
or load into AO, Al , A2, A3 (eight-bit) 1 
STR store constant or A0,A1,A2,A3 1 
or store A or CA to dual-port RAM 2 
LKUP lookup table 2 
BRNZ bit, addr branch to addr if test bit is set 1/2 
BRLE #const , addr branch to addr if index < #const 1/2 
CLR clear the carry bit of adder/subtracter 
or clear the carry register of multiplier 1 
NOP 1 
Table 4.14: Instruction set using pipeline technique 
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/ / S-box / / ShiftRows / / MixColumns 
LDA *AR0+ LDA RegO, A3 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A3 
LKUP A3 LDA Reg5, A2 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A2 
LKUP A2 LDA ReglO, Al MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, Al 
LKUP Al LDA Regl5, AO MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, AO 
LKUP AO STR A, *AR0+ STR A, *AR0+ 
STR A3, RegO LDA Reg4, A3 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A3 
STR A2, Regl LDA Reg9, A2 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A2 
STR Al , Reg2 LDA Regl4, Al MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, Al 
STR AO, Reg3 LDA Reg3, AO MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, AO 
LDA *AR0+ STR A, *AR0+ STR A, *AR0+ 
LKUP A3 LDA Reg8, A3 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A3 
LKUP A2 LDA Regl3, A2 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A2 
LKUP Al LDA Reg2, Al MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A l 
LKUP AO LDA Reg7, AO MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, AO 
STR A3, Reg4 STR A, *AR0+ STR A, *AR0+ 
STR A2, Reg5 LDA Regl2, A3 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A3 
STR Al , Reg6 LDA Regl, A2 MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, A2 
STR AO, Reg7 LDA Reg6, Al MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, Al 
LDA *AR0+ LDA Regl l , AO MixColumns *AR0, *AR2+, AO 
LKUP A3 STR A, *AR0+ STR A, *AR0+ 
LKUP A2 / /AddRoundKey 
LKUP Al XOR *AR0,*AR1+, A 
LKUP AO STR A, *AR0+ 
STR A3, Reg8 XOR *AR0,*AR1+, A 
STR A2, Reg9 STR A, *AR0+ 
STR Al , ReglO XOR *AR0,*AR1+, A 
STR AO, Regl l STR A, *AR0+ 
LDA *AR0+ 
LKUP A3 
LKUP A2 
LKUP Al 
LKUP AO 
STR A2, Regl2 
STR Al , Regl3 
STR AO, Regl4 
STR A3, Regl5 
Table 4.15: Codes for AES 
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5 . 1 C o n c l u s i o n s 
The architecture of a novel cryptographic processor that supports both public-key 
cryptosystem and secret-key cryptographic algorithms is proposed in this thesis. It 
provides flexibility for applications where public-key cryptography is first required 
for secure key exchange, and then secret-key cryptosystem is used for secure data 
transportation. It is suitable for resource limited devices such as smart cards and 
cellular phones where secure communication can be provided. 
In the design, the common components used by ECC, AES and RC5 are ex­
tracted. A novel multifunction multiplier is proposed which can perform multipli­
cations over GF(p) and GF(2n) in ECC and multiplications over GF(28) used in 
MixColumns operation in AES. The Reduced Area tree is utilized in the design of 
the multiplier, which provides flexibility to deal with the three cases. The number of 
reduction stages is the same as the one of only multiplications over GF(p) without 
affecting the critical path of the multiplier. 
The implementation of ECC is the most complex part in the design, which in­
volves selections of algorithms for the scalar multiplication kP, the coordinates for 
point in ECC, and the basis for finite fields over GF{p) and GF(2n). The Nonad-
jacent Form (NAF) is chosen for the scalar multiplication over GF(p) in modified 
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Jacobian projective coordinates; the Montgomery scalar multiplication is selected 
for the scalar multiplication over GF(2n) in projective coordinates. The polynomial 
basis is used for both finite fields, which flexibly converts the long operands into 
multiple-precision operations. This makes it possible that different elliptic curves 
can be implemented without changing the hardware. It increases the security of the 
processor considering that new elliptic curves should be adopted when the old one 
is no longer secure. 
The performance comparison indicates that the proposed hybrid crypto-processor 
can achieve better performance than previous work. 
5.2 Future Work 
The proposed design can support other cryptographic algorithms. For example, the 
RSA algorithm uses modular exponentiations which can be implemented through 
repeated multiplications and squarings. In addition, many other cryptosystems 
can be implemented after analyzing the algorithms, extracting common parts, and 
adding new components to the processor. 
The speed of the proposed processor can be much faster if the pipeline technique 
is applied and the instruction set is further optimized. 
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A p p e n d i x A 
P a r t o f V e r l i o g H D L c o d e s 
A.l Verilog HDL codes for multiplier 
module RA(S,MUL8,A,B,C,D,sig_sel,A8,A9,A10,All,A12,A13,A14); 
input [31:0] B,D; 
input [32:0] A,C; 
input sig-sel; input [7:0] A8,A9,A10,A11,A12,A13,A14; 
output [7:0] MUL8; 
output [64:0] S; 
wire [32:0] P31.P30, P29, P28, P27, P26, P25, P24, 
P23,P22,P21,P20,P19,P18,P17,P16,P15,P14,P13,P12,P11,P10,P9, 
P8,P7,P6,P5,P4,P3,P2,P1,P0; 
wire [58:0] Sum; 
wire [64:0] mul_P_64,mul_2n_64; 
/ / Partial Product Generation 
PP PP1(P31,P30, P29, P28, P27, P26, P25, P24, 
P23,P22,P21,P20,P19,P18,P17,P16,P15,P14,P13,P12,P11, 
P10,P9,P8,P7,P6,P5,P4,P3,P2,P1,P0,A, B); 
/ /Par t ia l Product Reduction 
/ /s tage2 
70 
//first 8*8 
IIIIIIIII11IIIII ha (Sum, Cout,A, B); 
ha HA1(NN2_0_1,NN2_1_2,P0[1],P1[0]); 
2],P1[1 
3],PI [2 
1],P1[3 
5], P I [4 
2],P4[1 
3],P1[5 
3],P4[2; 
7],P1[6 
4],P4[3 
],P2[o; 
],P2[1 
] ,P2[2; 
],P2[3; 
],P5[o; 
],P2[4 
],P5[1 
],P2[5; 
],P5[2 
fa FA1(NN2_0-2,NN2_1_3,P0[2 
fa FA2(NN2_0_3,NN2_1_4,P0[  
fa FA3(NN2_0_4,NN2_1_5,P0[4 
fa FA4(NN2_0_5,NN2_1_6,P0[5; 
fa FA5(NN2_2_5,NN2_3_6,P3[  
fa FA6(NN2_0_6,NN2_1_7,P0[6 
fa FA7(NN2_2_6,NN2_3_7,P3[  
fa FA8(NN2_0_7,NN2_1_8,P0[  
fa FA9(NN2_2_7,NN2_3_8,P3[  
ha HA2(NN2_4_7,NN2_5_8,P6[1],P7[0]); 
fa FA10(NN2_0_8,NN2_1_9,P1[7],P2[6],P3[5]); 
fa FA11(NN2^_8,NN2_3_9,P4[4],P5[3],P6[2]); 
fa FA12(NN2_0_9,NN2_1_10,P2[7],P3[6],P4[5]); 
fa FA13(NN2_2_9,NN2_3_10,P5[4],P6[3],P7[2]); 
fa FA14(NN2_0_10,NN2_1_11,P3[7],P4[6],P5[5]); 
fa FA15(NN2_0_11,NN2_1_12,P4[7],P5[6],P6[5]); 
fa FA16(NN2_0_12,NN2_1_13,P5[7],P6[6],P7[5]); 
/ /second 8*8 
faFA17(NN2_0_18,NN2_l_19,P8[10],P9[9],P10[8]); 
fa FA18(NN2_0_19,NN2_1_20,P8[11],P9[10],P10[9]); 
fa FA19(NN2_0_20,NN2_1_21,P8[12],P9[11],P10[10]) 
fa FA20(NN2_0_21,NN2_1_22,P8[13],P9[12],P10[11]) 
fa FA21(NN2_2_21,NN2_3_22,P11[10],P12[9],P13[8]) 
fa FA22(NN2_0_22,NN2_1_23,P8[14],P9[13],P10[12]) 
fa FA23(NN2^_22,NN2_3_23,P11[11],P12[10],P13[9]); 
71 
fa FA24(NN2_0_23,NN2_1_24,P8[15],P9[14],P10[13]); 
fa FA25(NN2^_23,NN2_3_24,P11[12],P12[11],P13[10]); 
ha HA4(NN2_4_23,NN2_5_24,P14[9],P15[8]); 
fa FA26(NN2_0_24,NN2_1_25,P9[15],P10[14],P11[13]); 
fa FA27(NN2^_24,NN2_3_25,P12[12],P13[11],P14[10]); 
fa FA28(NN2_0_25,NN2_1_26,P10[15],P11[14],P12[13]); 
fa FA29(NN2_2_25,NN2J_26,P13[12],P14[11],P15[10]); 
fa FA30(NN2_0_26,NN2_1_27,P11[15],P12[14],P13[13]); 
fa FA31(NN2_0_27,NN2_1_28,P12[15],P13[14],P14[13]); 
fa FA32(NN2_0_28,NN2_1_29,P13[15],P14[14],P15[13]); 
/ / th i rd 8*8 
ha HA5(NN2_0_33,NN2_1_34,P16[17],P17[16]); 
fa FA33(NN2_0_34,NN2_1_35,P16[18],P17[17],P18[16]); 
fa FA34(NN2_0_35,NN2_1_36,P16[19],P17[18],P18[17]); 
faFA35(NN2_0_36,NN2_l_37,P16[20],P17[19],P18[18]); 
fa FA36(NN2_0_37,NN2_1_38,P16[21],P17[20],P18[19]); 
fa FA37(NN2^_37,NN2_3_38,P19[18],P20[17],P21[16]); 
fa FA38(NN2_0_38,NN2_1_39,P16[22],P17[21],P18[20]); 
fa FA39(NN2^_38,NN2_3_39,P19[19],P20[18],P21[17]); 
fa FA40(NN2_0_39,NN2_1_40,P16[23],P17[22],P18[21]); 
fa FA41(NN2^_39,NN2_3_40,P19[20],P20[19],P21[18]); 
ha HA94(NN2_4_39,NN2_5_40,P22[17],P23[16]); 
fa FA42(NN2_0_40,NN2_1_41,P17[23],P18[22],P19[21]); 
fa FA43(NN2_2_40,NN2-3_41,P20[20],P21[19],P22[18]); 
fa FA44(NN2_0_41,NN2_1_42,P18[23],P19[22],P20[21]); 
fa FA45(NN2^_41,NN2_3_42,P21[20],P22[19],P23[18]); 
fa FA46(NN2_0_42,NN2_1_43,P19[23],P20[22],P21[21]); 
fa FA47(NN2_0_43,NN2_1_44,P20[23],P21[22],P22[21]); 
72 
fa FA48(NN2_0_44,NN2_1_45,P21[23],P22[22],P23[21]); 
ha HA93(NN2_0_45,NN2_1_46,P22[23],P23[22]); 
/ / fourth 8*8 
ha HA6(NN2_0_49,NN2_1_50,P24[25],P25[24]); 
fa FA49(NN2_0_50,NN2_1.51,P24[26],P25[25],P26[24] 
fa FA50(NN2_0_51,NN2_1.52,P24[27],P25[26],P26[25] 
fa FA51(NN2_0_52,NN2_1_53,P24[28],P25[27],P26[26] 
fa FA52(NN2_0_53,NN2_1_54,P24[29],P25[28],P26[27] 
fa FA53(NN2^_53,NN2_3_54,P27[26],P28[25],P29[24] 
fa FA54(NN2_0_54,NN2_1_55,P24[30],P25[29],P26[28] 
fa FA55(NN2_2_54,NN2_3_55,P27[27],P28[26],P29[25] 
fa FA56(NN2_0_55,NN2_1_56,P24[31],P25[30],P26[29] 
fa FA57(NN2_2_55,NN2_3_56,P27[28],P28[27],P29[26] 
ha HA7(NN2_4_55,NN2_5_56,P30[25],P31[24]); 
fa FA58(NN2_0_56,NN2_1_57,P25[31],P26[30],P27[29] 
faFA59(NN2^_56,NN2.3_57,P28[28],P29[27],P30[26] 
fa FA60(NN2_0_57,NN2_1_58,P26[31],P27[30],P28[29] 
fa FA61(NN2_2_57,NN2_3_58,P29[28],P30[27],P31[26] 
fa FA62(NN2_0_58,NN2_1_59,P27[31],P28[30],P29[29] 
fa FA63(NN2_0_59,NN2_1_60,P28[31],P29[30],P30[29] 
fa FA64(NN2_0_60,NN2_1_61,P29[31],P30[30],P31[29] 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / 
fa FA65(N2_0_8,N2_1_9,P0[8],P8[0],C[8]); / /col 9 
faFA66(N2_0_9,N2_l_10,P0[9],Pl[8],P8[l]); 
fa FA67(N2_2_9,N2_3_10,P9[0],C[9], D[9]); / /col 10 
fa FA68(N2_0_10,N2_1.11,P0[10],P1[9],P2[8]); 
fa FA69(N2_2_10,N2_3_11,P8[2],P9[1],P10[0]); / /col 11 
73 
faFA70(N2_0_ll,N2_l_12,P0[ll],Pl[10],P2[9]); 
fa FA71(N2_2_11,N2_3_12,P3[8],P8[3],P9[2]); 
fa FA72(N2_4_11,N2_5_12,P10[1],P11[0],C[11]); / /col 12 
fa FA73(N2_0_12,N2_1_13,P0[12],P1[11],P2[10]); 
fa FA74(N2_2_12,N2_3_13,P3[9],P4[8],P8[4]); 
fa FA75(N2_4_12,N2_5_13,P9[3],P10[2],P11[1]); 
fa FA76(N2_6_12,N2_7_13,P12[0],C[12],D[12]); / /co l 13 
fa FA77(N2_0_13,N2_1_14,P0[13],P1[12],P2[11]); 
fa FA78(N2_2_13,N2_3_14,P3[10],P4[9],P5[8]); 
fa FA79(N2_4_13,N2_5_14,P8[5],P9[4],P10[3]); 
fa FA80(N2_6_13,N2_7_14,P11[2],P12[1],P13[0]); / /col 14 
fa FA81(N2JO_14,N2_1.15,PO[14],P1[13],P2[12]); 
fa FA82(N2_2_14,N2_3_15,P3[11],P4[10],P5[9]); 
fa FA83(N2_4_14,N2_5_15,P6[8],P8[6],P9[5]); 
fa FA84(N2j6_14,N2_7_15,P10[4],P11[3],P12[2]); 
fa FA85(N2_8_14,N2_9_15,P13[1],P14[0],C[14]); / /col 15 
fa FA86(N2_0_15,N2_1_16,P0[15],P1[14],P2[13]); 
fa FA87(N2_2_15,N2_3_16,P3[12],P4[11],P5[10]); 
fa FA88(N2_4_15,N2_5_16,P6[9],P7[8],P8[7]); 
fa FA89(N2_6_15,N2_7_16,P9[6],P10[5],P11[4]); 
fa FA90(N2_8_15,N2_9_16,P12[3],P13[2],P14[1]); 
fa FA91(N2_10_15,N2_11_16,P15[0],C[15],D[15]); 
fa FA92(N2_0_16,N2_1_17,P0[16],P1[15],P2[14]); 
fa FA93(N2_2_16,N2_3_17,P3[13],P4[12],P5[11]); 
fa FA94(N2_4_16,N2_5_17,P6[10],P7[9],P9[7]); 
fa FA95(N2 j6_16,N2.7_17,P10[6] ,P11[5] ,P12[4]) ; 
fa FA96(N2_8_16,N2_9_17,P13[3],P14[2],P15[1]); 
fa FA97(N2_10_16,N2_11_17,P16[0],C[16],D[16]); 
74 
fa F A 9 8 ( N 2 j 0 . 1 7 , N 2 _ 1 . 1 8 , P 0 [ 1 7 ] , P 1 [ 1 6 ] , P 2 [ 1 5 ] ) ; 
fa F A 9 9 ( N 2 _ 2 _ 1 7 , N 2 _ 3 _ 1 8 , P 3 [ 1 4 ] , P 4 [ 1 3 ] , P 5 [ 1 2 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 0 0 ( N 2 _ 4 _ 1 7 , N 2 _ 5 _ 1 8 , P 6 [ 1 1 ] , P 7 [ 1 0 ] , P 1 0 [ 7 ] ; 
fa FA101(N2 j6 .17 ,N2_7_18 ,P11[6] ,P12[5] ,P13[4] ; 
fa F A 1 0 2 ( N 2 J 8 _ 1 7 , N 2 J 9 . 1 8 , P 1 4 [ 3 ] , P 1 5 [ 2 ] , P 1 6 [ 1 ] ; 
fa F A 1 0 3 ( N 2 _ 1 0 _ 1 7 , N 2 _ 1 1 _ 1 8 , P 1 7 [ 0 ] , C [ 1 7 ] , D [ 1 7 ] 
fa F A 1 0 4 ( N 2 _ 0 _ 1 8 , N 2 _ 1 _ 1 9 , P 0 [ 1 8 ] , P 1 [ 1 7 ] , P 2 [ 1 6 ] ; 
fa F A 1 0 5 ( N 2 _ 2 _ 1 8 , N 2 J _ 1 9 , P 3 [ 1 5 ] , P 4 [ 1 4 ] , P 5 [ 1 3 ] ; 
fa F A 1 0 6 ( N 2 _ 4 _ 1 8 , N 2 _ 5 _ 1 9 , P 6 [ 1 2 ] , P 7 [ 1 1 ] , P 1 1 [ 7 ] ; 
fa FA107(N2 j6_18 ,N2_7 .19 ,P12[6 ] ,P13[5 ] ,P14[4 ] ; 
fa F A 1 0 8 ( N 2 J 8 - 1 8 , N 2 J 9 _ 1 9 , P 1 5 [ 3 ] , P 1 6 [ 2 ] , P 1 7 [ 1 ] ; 
fa F A 1 0 9 ( N 2 _ 1 0 _ 1 8 , N 2 _ 1 1 _ 1 9 , P 1 8 [ 0 ] , C [ 1 8 ] , D [ 1 8 ] 
fa F A 1 1 0 ( N 2 _ 0 _ 1 9 , N 2 _ 1 _ 2 0 , P 0 [ 1 9 ] , P 1 [ 1 8 ] , P 2 [ 1 7 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 1 ( N 2 ^ _ 1 9 , N 2 _ 3 _ 2 0 , P 3 [ 1 6 ] , P 4 [ 1 5 ] , P 5 [ 1 4 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 2 ( N 2 _ 4 _ 1 9 , N 2 _ 5 _ 2 0 , P 6 [ 1 3 ] , P 7 [ 1 2 ] , P 1 2 [ 7 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 3 ( N 2 _ 6 _ 1 9 , N 2 _ 7 _ 2 0 , P 1 3 [ 6 ] , P 1 4 [ 5 ] , P 1 5 [ 4 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 4 ( N 2 _ 8 _ 1 9 , N 2 . 9 _ 2 0 , P 1 6 [ 3 ] , P 1 7 [ 2 ] , P 1 8 [ 1 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 5 ( N 2 _ 1 0 . 1 9 , N 2 _ 1 1 _ 2 0 , P 1 9 [ 0 ] , C [ 1 9 ] , D [ 1 9 ] 
fa F A 1 1 6 ( N 2 _ 0 _ 2 0 , N 2 _ 1 _ 2 1 , P 0 [ 2 0 ] , P 1 [ 1 9 ] , P 2 [ 1 8 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 7 ( N 2 ^ _ 2 0 , N 2 _ 3 - 2 1 , P 3 [ 1 7 ] , P 4 [ 1 6 ] , P 5 [ 1 5 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 8 ( N 2 _ 4 _ 2 0 , N 2 _ 5 _ 2 1 , P 6 [ 1 4 ] , P 7 [ 1 3 ] , P 1 3 [ 7 ] ; 
fa F A 1 1 9 ( N 2 _ 6 _ 2 0 , N 2 _ 7 _ 2 1 , P 1 4 [ 6 ] , P 1 5 [ 5 ] , P 1 6 [ 4 ] ; 
fa FA120(N2 J 8_20 ,N2_9J21 ,P17 [3 ] ,P18 [2 ] ,P19 [1 ] ; 
fa F A 1 2 1 ( N 2 _ 1 0 _ 2 0 , N 2 _ 1 1 _ 2 1 , P 2 0 [ 0 ] , C [ 2 0 ] , D [ 2 0 ] 
fa F A 1 2 2 ( N 2 _ 0 _ 2 1 , N 2 _ 1 _ 2 2 , P 0 [ 2 1 ] , P 1 [ 2 0 ] , P 2 [ 1 9 ] ; 
fa F A 1 2 3 ( N 2 _ 2 _ 2 1 , N 2 _ 3 _ 2 2 , P 3 [ 1 8 ] , P 4 [ 1 7 ] , P 5 [ 1 6 ] ; 
fa F A 1 2 4 ( N 2 _ 4 _ 2 1 , N 2 . 5 _ 2 2 , P 6 [ 1 5 ] , P 7 [ 1 4 ] , P 1 4 [ 7 ] ) 
fa F A 1 2 5 ( N 2 _ 6 _ 2 1 , N 2 _ 7 _ 2 2 , P 1 5 [ 6 ] , P 1 6 [ 5 ] , P 1 7 [ 4 ] ) 
7 5 
fa FA126(N2^_21,N2_9_22,P18[3],P19[2],P20[1]); 
fa FA127(N2_10_21,N2_11_22,P21[0],C[21],D[21]); 
fa FA128(N2_0_22,N2_1_23,P0[22],P1[21],P2[20]); 
fa FA129(N2^_22,N2_3_23,P3[19],P4[18],P5[17]); 
fa FA130(N2_4_22,N2_5_23,P6[16],P7[15],P15[7]); 
faFA131(N2_6_22,N2_7_23,P16[6],P17[5],P18[4]); 
fa FA132(N2 J8^2,N2_9_23,P19[3],P20[2],P21[1]); 
fa FA133(N2_10_22,N2_11_23,P22[0],C[22],D[22]); 
fa FA134(N2_0_23,N2_1_24,P0[23],P1 [22],P2[21]); 
fa FA135(N2^_23,N2_3_24,P3[20],P4[19],P5[18]); 
fa FA136(N2_4_23,N2_5_24,P6[17],P7[16],P16[7]); 
fa FA137(N2_6_23,N2_7_24,P17[6],P18[5],P19[4]); 
fa FA138(N2J8_23,N2_9_24,P20[3],P21[2],P22[1]); 
fa FA139(N2_10_23,N2_11.24,P23[0],C[23],D[23]); 
fa FA140(N2JD_24,N2_1_25,P0[24],P1[23],P2[22]); 
fa FA141(N2^_24,N2.3_25,P3[21],P4[20],P5[19]); 
fa FA142(N2_4_24,N2_5_25,P6[18],P7[17],P8[16]); 
fa FA143(N2_6_24,N2_7_25,P16[8],P17[7],P18[6]); 
fa FA144(N2^8_24,N2_9_25,P19[5],P20[4],P21[3]); 
fa FA145(N2_10_24,N2_11_25,P22[2],P23[1],P24[0]); 
fa FA146(N2_0_25,N2_1_26,P0[25],P1 [24],P2[23]); 
fa FA147(N2_2_25,N2J_26,P3[22],P4[21],P5[20]); 
fa FA148(N2_4_25,N2_5_26,P6[19],P7[18],P8[17]); 
fa FA149(N2_6_25,N2_7_26,P9[16],P16[9],P17[8]); 
fa FA150(N2^_25,N2_9_26,P18[7],P19[6],P20[5]); 
fa FA151(N2_10_25,N2_11_26,P21[4],P22[3],P23[2]); 
fa FA152(N2_12_25,N2.13_26,P24[1],P25[0],C[25]); 
fa FA153(N2_0_26,N2_1_27,P0[26],P1[25],P2[24]); 
76 
fa FA154(N2_2_26,N2_3_27,P3[23],P4[22],P5[21]); 
fa FA155(N2_4_26,N2_5_27,P6[20],P7[19],P8[18]); 
fa FA156(N2J6_26,N2_7_27,P9[17],P10[16],P16[10]); 
faFA157(N2 J8-26,N2_9_27,P17[9],P18[8],P19[7]); 
fa FA158(N2_10_26,N2_11_27,P20[6],P21[5],P22[4]); 
fa FA159(N2_12_26,N2_13_27,P23[3],P24[2],P25[1]); 
fa FA160(N2_14_26,N2_15_27,P26[0],C[26],D[26]); 
fa FA161(N2_0_27,N2_1_28,P0[27],P1[26],P2[25]); 
fa FA162(N2^_27,N2_3_28,P3[24],P4[23],P5[22]); 
fa FA163(N2_4_27,N2_5_28,P6[21],P7[20],P8[19]); 
fa FA164(N2_6_27,N2_7_28,P9[18],P10[17],P11[16]); 
fa FA165(N2^_27,N2_9_28,P16[11],P17[10],P18[9]); 
fa FA166(N2_10_27,N2_11_28,P19[8],P20[7],P21[6]); 
fa FA167(N2_12_27,N2_13_28,P22[5],P23[4],P24[3]); 
fa FA168(N2_14_27,N2_15_28,P25[2],P26[1],P27[0]); 
faFA169(N2J0_28,N2_l_29,PO[28],Pl[27],P2[26]); 
fa FA170(N2_2_28,N2_3_29,P3[25],P4[24],P5[23]); 
fa FA171(N2_4_28,N2_5_29,P6[22],P7[21],P8[20]); 
fa FA172(N2_6_28,N2_7_29,P9[19],P10[18],P11[17]); 
fa FA173(N2^_28,N2_9_29,P12[16],P16[12],P17[11]); 
fa FA174(N2_10_28,N2_11_29,P18[10],P19[9],P20[8]); 
fa FA175(N2_12_28,N2_13_29,P21[7],P22[6],P23[5]); 
fa FA176(N2_14_28,N2_15_29,P24[4],P25[3],P26[2]); 
fa FA177(N2_16_28,N2_17_29,P27[1],P28[0],C[28]); 
fa FA178(N2_0_29,N2_1_30,P0[29],P1[28],P2[27]); 
fa FA179(N2_2_29,N2_3-30,P3[26],P4[25],P5[24]); 
fa FA180(N2.4_29,N2_5_30,P6[23],P7[22],P8[21]); 
fa FA181(N2.6_29,N2_7_30,P9[20],P10[19],P11[18]); 
77 
fa F A 1 8 2 ( N 2 J 8 _ 2 9 , N 2 _ 9 J 0 , P 1 2 [ 1 7 ] , P 1 3 [ 1 6 ] , P 1 6 [ 1 3 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 8 3 ( N 2 _ 1 0 _ 2 9 , N 2 _ 1 1 _ 3 0 , P 1 7 [ 1 2 ] , P 1 8 [ 1 1 ] , P 1 9 [ 1 0 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 8 4 ( N 2 _ 1 2 _ 2 9 , N 2 _ 1 3 _ 3 0 , P 2 0 [ 9 ] , P 2 1 [ 8 ] , P 2 2 [ 7 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 8 5 ( N 2 _ 1 4 _ 2 9 , N 2 _ 1 5 _ 3 0 , P 2 3 [ 6 ] , P 2 4 [ 5 ] , P 2 5 [ 4 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 8 6 ( N 2 _ 1 6 _ 2 9 , N 2 _ 1 7 _ 3 0 , P 2 6 [ 3 ] , P 2 7 [ 2 ] , P 2 8 [ 1 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 8 7 ( N 2 _ 1 8 _ 2 9 , N 2 _ 1 9 _ 3 0 , P 2 9 [ 0 ] , C [ 2 9 ] , D [ 2 9 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 8 8 ( N 2 j 0 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 1 _ 3 1 , P 0 [ 3 0 ] , P 1 [ 2 9 ] , P 2 [ 2 8 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 8 9 ( N 2 _ 2 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 3 _ 3 1 , P 3 [ 2 7 ] , P 4 [ 2 6 ] , P 5 [ 2 5 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 0 ( N 2 _ 4 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 5 _ 3 1 , P 6 [ 2 4 ] , P 7 [ 2 3 ] , P 8 [ 2 2 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 1 ( N 2 _ 6 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 7 _ 3 1 , P 9 [ 2 1 ] , P 1 0 [ 2 0 ] , P 1 1 [ 1 9 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 2 ( N 2 _ 8 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 9 _ 3 1 , P 1 2 [ 1 8 ] , P 1 3 [ 1 7 ] , P 1 4 [ 1 6 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 3 ( N 2 _ 1 0 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 1 1 _ 3 1 , P 1 6 [ 1 4 ] , P 1 7 [ 1 3 ] , P 1 8 [ 1 2 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 4 ( N 2 _ 1 2 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 1 3 _ 3 1 , P 1 9 [ 1 1 ] , P 2 0 [ 1 0 ] , P 2 1 [ 9 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 5 ( N 2 _ 1 4 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 1 5 _ 3 1 , P 2 2 [ 8 ] , P 2 3 [ 7 ] , P 2 4 [ 6 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 6 ( N 2 _ 1 6 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 1 7 _ 3 1 , P 2 5 [ 5 ] , P 2 6 [ 4 ] , P 2 7 [ 3 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 7 ( N 2 _ 1 8 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 1 9 _ 3 1 , P 2 8 [ 2 ] , P 2 9 [ 1 ] , P 3 0 [ 0 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 8 ( N 2 ^ 0 _ 3 0 , N 2 _ 2 1 _ 3 1 , P 1 5 [ 1 5 ] , C [ 3 0 ] , D [ 3 0 ] ) ; 
fa F A 1 9 9 ( N 2 _ 0 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 1 _ 3 2 , P 0 [ 3 1 ] , P 1 [ 3 0 ] , P 2 [ 2 9 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 0 ( N 2 _ 2 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 3 _ 3 2 , P 3 [ 2 8 ] , P 4 [ 2 7 ] , P 5 [ 2 6 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 1 ( N 2 _ 4 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 5 _ 3 2 , P 6 [ 2 5 ] , P 7 [ 2 4 ] , P 8 [ 2 3 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 2 ( N 2 _ 6 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 7 _ 3 2 , P 9 [ 2 2 ] , P 1 0 [ 2 1 ] , P 1 1 [ 2 0 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 3 ( N 2 J 8 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 9 _ 3 2 , P 1 2 [ 1 9 ] , P 1 3 [ 1 8 ] , P 1 4 [ 1 7 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 4 ( N 2 _ 1 0 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 1 1 _ 3 2 , P 1 5 [ 1 6 ] , P 1 6 [ 1 5 ] , P 1 7 [ 1 4 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 5 ( N 2 _ 1 2 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 1 3 _ 3 2 , P 1 8 [ 1 3 ] , P 1 9 [ 1 2 ] , P 2 0 [ 1 1 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 6 ( N 2 _ 1 4 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 1 5 _ 3 2 , P 2 1 [ 1 0 ] , P 2 2 [ 9 ] , P 2 3 [ 8 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 7 ( N 2 _ 1 6 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 1 7 _ 3 2 , P 2 4 [ 7 ] , P 2 5 [ 6 ] , P 2 6 [ 5 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 8 ( N 2 _ 1 8 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 1 9 _ 3 2 , P 2 7 [ 4 ] , P 2 8 [ 3 ] , P 2 9 [ 2 ] ) ; 
fa F A 2 0 9 ( N 2 ^ 0 _ 3 1 , N 2 _ 2 1 _ 3 2 , P 3 0 [ 1 ] , P 3 1 [ 0 ] , C [ 3 1 ] ) ; 
7 8 
fa FA210(N2_0_32,N2_1_33,P1[31],P2[30],P3[29]); 
fa FA211 (N2_2_32,N2_3_33,P4[28],P5[27],P6[26]); 
fa FA212(N2_4_32,N2_5_33,P7[25],P8[24],P9[23]); 
fa FA213(N2_6_32,N2_7_33,P10[22],P11[21],P12[20]); 
fa FA214(N2^_32,N2_9_33,P13[19],P14[18],P15[17]); 
fa FA215(N2_10_32,N2_11_33,P17[15],P18[14],P19[13]); 
fa FA216(N2_12_32,N2_13_33,P20[12],P21[11],P22[10]); 
fa FA217(N2_14_32,N2_15_33,P23[9],P24[8],P25[7]); 
fa FA218(N2_16_32,N2_17_33,P26[6],P27[5],P28[4]); 
fa FA219(N2_18_32,N2_19_33,P29[3],P30[2],P31[1]); 
fa FA220(N2_20_32,N2_21_33,P16[16],P0[32],C[32]); 
fa FA221(N2_0_33,N2_1_34,P2[31],P3[30],P4[29]); 
faFA222(N2^_33,N2_3_34,P5[28],P6[27],P7[26]); 
fa FA223(N2_4_33,N2_5_34,P8[25],P9[24],P10[23]); 
fa FA224(N2_6_33,N2_7_34,P11[22],P12[21],P13[20]); 
fa FA225(N2^_33,N2_9_34,P14[19],P15[18],P18[15]); 
fa FA226(N2_10_33,N2_11_34,P19[14],P20[13],P21[12]); 
fa FA227(N2_12_33,N2_13_34,P22[11],P23[10],P24[9]); 
fa FA228(N2_14_33,N2_15_34,P25[8],P26[7],P27[6]); 
fa FA229(N2_16_33,N2_17.34,P28[5],P29[4],P30[3]); / /col 34 
fa FA230(N2_0_34,N2_1_35,P3[31],P4[30],P5[29]); 
fa FA231 (N2^_34,N2_3_35,P6[28],P7[27],P8[26]); 
fa FA232(N2_4_34,N2_5_35,P9[25],P10[24],P11[23]); 
fa FA233(N2_6_34,N2_7_35,P12[22],P13[21],P14[20]); 
fa FA234(N2J8_34,N2_9_35,P15[19],P19[15],P20[14]); 
fa FA235(N2_10_34,N2_11_35,P21[13],P22[12],P23[11]); 
fa FA236(N2_12_34,N2_13_35,P24[10],P25[9],P26[8]); 
fa FA237(N2_14_34,N2_15_35,P27[7],P28[6],P29[5]); 
79 
faFA238(N2_16_34,N2_17_35,P30[4],P31[3],P2[32]); 
fa FA239(N2_0-35,N2_1_36,P4[31],P5[30],P6[29]); 
fa FA240(N2^_35,N2_3_36,P7[28],P8[27],P9[26]); 
fa FA241(N2_4_35,N2_5_36,P10[25],P11[24],P12[23]); 
fa FA242(N2_6_35,N2_7_36,P13[22],P14[21],P15[20]); 
fa FA243(N2_8_35,N2_9_36,P20[15],P21[14],P22[13]); 
fa FA244(N2_10_35,N2_11_36,P23[12],P24[11],P25[10]); 
fa FA245(N2_12_35,N2_13_36,P26[9],P27[8],P28[7]); 
fa FA246(N2_14_35,N2_15_36,P29[6],P30[5],P31[4]); 
fa FA247(N2_0_36,N2_1_37,P5[31],P6[30],P7[29]); 
fa FA248(N2_2_36,N2_3_37,P8[28],P9[27],P10[26]); 
fa FA249(N2_4_36,N2_5_37,P11[25],P12[24],P13[23]); 
fa FA250(N2_6_36,N2_7_37,P14[22],P15[21],P21[15]); 
fa FA251(N2^_36,N2_9_37,P22[14],P23[13],P24[12]); 
fa FA252(N2_10_36,N2_11_37,P25[11],P26[10],P27[9]); 
fa FA253(N2_12_36,N2_13_37,P28[8],P29[7],P30[6]); 
fa FA254(N2_0_37,N2_1_38,P6[31],P7[30],P8[29]); 
fa FA255(N2_2_37,N2_3_38,P9[28],P10[27],P11[26]); 
fa FA256(N2_4_37,N2_5_38,P12[25],P13[24],P14[23]); 
fa FA257(N2_6_37,N2_7_38,P15[22],P22[15],P23[14]); 
fa FA258(N2J8_37,N2_9_38,P24[13],P25[12],P26[11]); 
fa FA259(N2_10_37,N2_11_38,P27[10],P28[9],P29[8]); 
fa FA260(N2_12_37,N2_13_38,P30[7],P31[6],P5[32]); 
fa FA261(N2_0_38,N2_1_39,P7[31],P8[30],P9[29]); 
fa FA262(N2_2_38,N2_3_39,P10[28],P11[27],P12[26]); 
fa FA263(N2_4_38,N2_5_39,P13[25],P14[24],P15[23]); 
fa FA264(N2_6_38,N2_7_39,P23[15],P24[14],P25[13]); 
fa FA265(N2J8_38,N2.9_39,P26[12],P27[11],P28[10]); 
80 
fa FA266(N2_10_38,N2_11_39,P29[9],P30[8],P31[7]) 
fa FA267(N2_0_39,N2_1_40,P8[31],P9[30],P10[29]); 
fa FA268(N2_2_39,N2_3_40,P11[28; 
fa FA269(N2_4_39,N2_5_40,P14[25; 
fa FA270(N2_6_39,N2_7_40,P25[14 
fa FA271(N2^_39,N2_9_40,P28[11 
fa FA272(N2_0_40,N2_1_41,P9[31]V 
fa FA273(N2^_40,N2.3_41,P12[28 
fa FA274(N2_4_40,N2_5_41,P15[25; 
fa FA275(N2_6_40,N2_7_41,P25[15; 
fa FA276(N2J8_40,N2_9_41,P28[12 
fa FA277(N2_0_41,N2_1_42,P10[31 
fa FA278(N2_2_41,N2_3_42,P13[28; 
fa FA279(N2_4_41,N2_5_42,P16[25; 
fa FA280(N2_6_41,N2_7_42,P25[16; 
fa FA281(N2^_41,N2_9_42,P28[13; 
fa FA282(N2_0_42,N2_1_43,P11[31 
fa FA283(N2_2_42,N2_3_43,P14[28; 
fa FA284(N2_4_42,N2.5_43,P17[25; 
fa FA285(N2_6_42,N2_7_43,P25[17 
fa FA286(N2^_42,N2_9_43,P28[14 
fa FA287(N2_0_43,N2_1_44,P12[31 
fa FA288(N2_2_43,N2_3_44,P15[28 
fa FA289(N2_4_43,N2_5_44,P18[25 
fa FA290(N2_6_43,N2_7_44,P25[18 
fa FA291(N2^_43,N2_9_44,P28[15 
fa FA292(N2_0_44,N2_1_45,P13[31 
fa FA293(N2_2_44,N2_3_45,P16[28 
],P12[27] ,P13[26]) 
],P15[24] ,P24[15]) 
],P26[13] ,P27[12]) 
],P29[10] ,P30[9]); 
P10[30],P11[29]); 
],P13[27] ,P14[26]) 
],P16[24] ,P24[16]) 
],P26[14] ,P27[13]) 
],P29[11] ,P30[10]) 
],P11[30] ,P12[29]) 
],P14[27] ,P15[26]) 
],P17[24] ,P24[17]) 
],P26[15] ,P27[14]) 
],P29[12] ,P30[11]) 
],P12[30] ,P13[29]) 
],P15[27] ,P16[26]) 
],P18[24] ,P24[18]) 
'],P26[16] ,P27[15]) 
],P29[13] ,P30[12]) 
],P13[30] ,P14[29]) 
],P16[27] ,P17[26]) 
],P19[24] ,P24[19]) 
],P26[17] ,P27[16]) 
],P29[14] ,P30[13]) 
],P14[30] ,P15[29]) 
],P17[27] ,P18[26]) 
81 
fa FA294(N2_4_44,N2_5_45,P19[25],P20[24] 
fa FA295(N2_6_44,N2_7_45,P25[19],P26[18] 
fa FA296(N2^_44,N2_9_45,P28[16],P29[15] 
fa FA297(N2_0_45,N2_1_46,P14[31],P15[30] 
fa FA298(N2_2_45,N2_3_46,P17[28],P18[27] 
fa FA299(N2_4_45,N2_5_46,P20[25],P21[24] 
fa FA300(N2_6_45,N2_7_46,P25[20],P26[19] 
fa FA301(N2J8_45,N2J9_46,P28[17],P29[16] 
fa FA302(N2_0_46,N2_1_47,P15[31],P16[30] 
fa FA303(N2_2_46,N2J_47,P18[28],P19[27] 
fa FA304(N2_4_46,N2_5_47,P21[25],P22[24] 
fa FA305(N2_6_46,N2_7_47,P25[21],P26[20] 
fa FA306(N2^_46,N2_9_47,P28[18],P29[17] 
fa FA307(N2_10_46,N2_11_47,P31[15],P23 
fa FA308(N2_0_47,N2_1_48,P16[31],P17[30] 
fa FA309(N2_2_47,N2_3_48,P19[28],P20[27] 
fa FA310(N2_4_47,N2_5_48,P22[25],P23[24] 
fa FA311(N2_6_47,N2_7_48,P25[22],P26[21] 
fa FA312(N2_8_47,N2_9_48,P28[19],P29[18] 
fa FA313(N2_0_48,N2_1_49,P17[31],P18[30] 
fa FA314(N2_2_48,N2J_49,P20[28],P21[27] 
fa FA315(N2_4_48,N2_5_49,P23[25],P25[23] 
fa FA316(N2_6_48,N2_7_49,P27[21],P28[20] 
fa FA317(N2_8_48,N2_9_49,P30[18],P31[17] 
fa FA318(N2_0_49,N2_1_50,P18[31],P19[30] 
fa FA319(N2^_49,N2_3_50,P21[28],P22[27] 
fa FA320(N2_4_49,N2_5_50,P26[23],P27[22] 
fa FA321(N2_6_49,N2_7_50,P29[20],P30[19] 
P24[20]); 
P27[17]); 
P30[14]); 
P16[29]); 
P19[26]); 
P24[21]); 
P27[18]); 
P30[15]); 
P17[29]); 
P20[26]); 
P24[22]); 
P27[19]); 
P30[16]); 
[23],P14[32]);//col 47 
P18[29]); 
P21[26]) 
P24[23]) 
P27[20]) 
P30[17]) 
P19[29]) 
P22[26]) 
P26[22]) 
P29[19]) 
P24[24]) 
P20[29]) 
P23[26]) 
P28[21]) 
P31[18]) 
82 
fa FA322(N2_0. 
fa FA323(N2^. 
fa FA324(N2_4. 
fa FA325(N2_0. 
fa FA326(N2^. 
fa FA327(N2_4. 
fa FA328(N2_0. 
fa FA329(N2^. 
fa FA330(N2_0. 
fa FA331(N2_0. 
.50,N2_1 
50,N2_3 
.50,N2_5 
.51,N2_1 
.51,N2_3 
.51,N2_5 
.52,N2_1 
.52,N2_3 
.53,N2_1 
.54,N2_1 
.51,P19[31 
.51,P22[28 
_51,P28[22 
_52,P20[31 
_52,P23[28 
_52,P30[21 
_53,P21[31 
_53,P29[23 
.54,P22[31 
.55,P23[31 
],P20[30],P21[29] 
],P23[27],P27[23] 
],P29[21],P30[20] 
],P21[30],P22[29] 
],P28[23],P29[22] 
],P31[20],P19[32] 
],P22[30],P23[29] 
],P30[22],P31[21] 
],P23[30],P30[23] 
],P31[23],P22[32] 
my_multiplexier ml(S,mulJP_64,mul_2n_64,sig-sel); 
/ / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / / m u l 8 bit IIIIIIIIIIIIllll 
wire [14:0] mul^_l,mul_8_2,mul^_3,mul J8_4; 
wire [7:0] P8_1,P8_2,P8_3,P8.4; 
assign mul_8_l={ NN3_0_14,NN3_0_13,NN3_0_12,NN3_0_11,NN3_0_10, 
NN3_0_9,NN3_0_8,NN3_0_7,NN3_0_6,NN3_0_5,NN3_0_4, 
NN3.0-3,NN3_0_2,NN3_0_1,NN3_0_0 }, 
mul_8_2={P15[15],NN3_0-29,NN3_0_28,NN3_0_27,NN3_0_26,NN3_0_25, 
NN3_0-24,NN3_0_23,NN3_0_22,NN3_0_21,NN3_0_20, 
NN3_0_19,NN3_0_18,NN3_0_17,NN3_0_16}, 
muL8_3=NN3_0_46,NN3_0-45,NN3_0_44, 
NN3_0_43,NN3_0_42,NN3_0_41,NN3_0_40,NN3_0_39,NN3_0_38,NN3_0_37, 
NN3_0_36,NN3_0_35,NN3_0_34,NN3_0_33,NN3_0_32, 
mul_8_4=NN3_0_62,NN3_0.61,NN3_0_60, 
NN3_0_59,NN3_0_58,NN3_0_57,NN3_0_56,NN3-0_55,NN3.0-54,NN3-0_53, 
NN3_0-52,NN3_0_51,NN3_0.50,NN3_0_49,P24[24]}; 
///PPR(A,P,A8,A9,A10,A11,A12,A13,A14); 
83 
PPR ppr_l(P8_l,mul_8_l,A8,A9,A10,All,Al2,A13,A14); 
PPR ppr_2(P8_2,mul_8_2,A8,A9,A10,All,Al2,Al3,A14); 
PPR ppr_3(P8_3,mul_8_3,A8,A9,A10,All,A12,A13,A14); 
PPR ppr_4(P8-4,mul_8_4,A8,A9,Al0,All,A12,A13,A14); 
assign MUL8=P8_1 A P8-2 A P8_3 A P8-4; 
endmodule 
A.2 Verilog HDL codes for the data path of the 
processor 
module myalu(addral,addrbl,addra2,addrb2,in_RAM,Zflag, 
indexl_flag,index2_flag,cmp_flagl,cmpJlag2,dataJnl,dataJn2,dataJn3, 
datain4,instr,tmp,mul_squ_sel,px_sel, carry_clr,sel_l,load-Sum, 
load_Carry,lr,sub,first, sel_regout,sel_A,sel_RAM, 
load_Cbit,load_B, load_A0,load_Al,load_A2,load_A3, 
load ^ addrRO, load^addrRl, load_addrR2 ,load_addrR3, 
incJndexl,inc_Index2,dec_Indexl,dec_Index2, 
inc_R0,inc_Rl,inc_R2,inc_R3,reg_en,enc,read_en,clk,rst); 
output [31:0] in _RAM; 
output Zflag; 
output indexl _flag,index2_flag,cmp_flagl ,cmp_flag2; 
output [7:0] addral,addrbl,addra2,addrb2; 
input [31:0] data_inl ,dataJn2,dataJn3,dataJn4; 
input mul_squ_sel,carry_clr,sel_l,clk,rst; 
input load-Sum,load_Carry,px_sel; / /pxj3el=l , GF(P), pxse\=0,GF(2n) 
input lr,sub,first; / /control the barrel-shifter,lr=l, left, lr=0, right s u b = l , subtrac­
tion 
input [1:0] selJRAM; 
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input [2:0] sel_A; 
input load_Cbit,load_B,load_A0,load_Al,load_A2,load_A3; 
input [7:0] instr; 
input [7:0] tmp; 
input [3:0] sel_regout; 
input load .addr R0,load_addrRl ,load_addrR2,load_addrR3,inc_R0,inc_Rl; 
input inc_R2, inc_R3, decJndexl ,decJndex2,reg_en,enc,read_en; 
input incJndexl,inc_Index2; 
reg indexl_flag,index2_flag,cmp_flagl,cmp_flag2; 
wire [31:0] sum; 
wire [32:0] carry, ml_out,Carr_out;//,data_C; 
wire [31:0] m2_out,B_out,rst_S,mm2jout; 
wire [7:0] A0_out,Al_out,A2_out,A3_out; 
wire [31:0] rst_xor,rst_shft,rst_addsub; 
wire [7:0] m3_out,m4_out,m5_out,m6_out; 
wire [7:0] mult8; 
wire [7:0] A8_out,A9_out,A10_out,All_out,Al2_out,Al3_out,Al4_out; 
wire [7:0] regout,indexl,index2,rom_table; 
multi32 mym2(m2_out,data_in2,dataJn3,sel_l); 
multi32 mymm2(mm2_out,dataJn3,dataJn2,sel_l); 
multi33 myml(ml_out,l 'bO,dataJnl,dataJnl,l 'b0,mul_squ_sel); 
RA mull (carry,sum, mult8, ml_out, m2_out,Carr_out,mm2_out,px_sel, 
A8_out,A9_out,A10_out,All_out,Al2_out,Al3_out,A14_out); 
Register_32 Reg_S(rst_S, sum,load_Sum,clk,rst); 
data_ce!133xlr Reg_Carry(Carr_out,carry,load_Carry,carry_clr,clk,rst); 
multi7J8 mym3(m3_out, mult8,datainl[31:24], rst_shft[31:24], 
rst_xor[31:24], regout,dataJn4[31:24],rom_table,sel_A), 
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mym4(m4jout, mult8,dataJnl[23:16], rst_shft[23:16], 
rst_xor [23:16], regout,dataJn4[23:16],rom_table,sel_A), 
mym5(m5_out, mult8,dataJnl[15:8], rst_shft[15:8], 
rst_xor[15:8], regout,dataJn4[15:8], rom_table,sel_A), 
mym6(m6j0ut, mult8,dataJnl[7:0], rst_shft[7:0], 
rst_xor[7:0], regout,data_in4[7:0], rom_table,sel_A); 
Register_32 Reg_B(B_out, m2_out,load_B,clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A0(A0_out,m3_out,load_A0,clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_Al(Al_out,m4_out,load_Al,clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A2(A2_out,m5_out,load_A2,clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A3(A3_out,m6j3ut,load_A3,clk,rst); 
wire [7:0] reginput; 
wire [31:0] En_sig; 
wire [7:0] Reg_0_out,Reg_l_out,Reg_2_out,Reg_3_out,Reg_4_out,Reg_5_out,Reg_6_out, 
Reg_7_out,Reg^8_out,Reg_9_out,Reg_10jout,Reg_ll_out,Reg_12_out,Reg_13_out, 
Reg_14_out,Reg_15_out; 
wire [7:0] R0_out,Rl_out,R2_out,R3_out; 
wire [3:0] sel_regout; 
multi5^8 mxl(reginput ,A0_out,Al_out,A2_out,A3_out, tmp,instr[7:5]); 
demulti8 dmx(En_sig,instr[4:0],regjen); 
multi 16 ^ 8 mx3 (regout, Reg_0 _out, Reg_l _out ,Reg_2_out, Reg_3 _out, 
Reg_4_out, Reg_5 .out ,Reg_6_out ,Reg_7_out, Reg_8 _out, 
Reg_9 _out, Reg.l 0_out ,Reg_l 1 _out ,Reg_l 2_out, 
Reg_l 3 _out, Reg_l 4_out, Reg_l 5 _out, sel -regout); 
/ / 16 8-bit register used for shiftrows 
Register_8 Reg_0(Reg_0_out, reginput,En_sig[0],elk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_l(Reg_l_out, reginput,En_sig[l],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_2(Reg_2_out, reginput,En_sig[2],clk,rst); 
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Register_8 Reg_3(Reg_3_out, reginput,En_sig[3],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_4(Reg_4_out, reginput,En jsig[4],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_5(Reg_5_out, reginput,En_sig[5],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_6(Reg_6_out, reginput,En_sig[6],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_7(Reg_7_out, reginput,En_sig[7],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_8(Reg_8_out, reginput,En_sig[8],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_9(Reg_9_out, reginput,En_sig[9],clk,rst); 
Register^ Reg_10(Reg_10_out, reginput,En_sig[10],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_l l (Reg_l l_out , reginput,En_sig[ll],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_12(Reg_12_out, reginput,En_sig[12],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_13(Reg_13_out, reginput,En_sig[13],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_14(Reg_14_out, reginput,En_sig[14],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_15(Reg_15_out, reginput,En_sig[15],clk,rst); 
/ / used for dual-port RAM 
RegisterJnc_8 R0(R0_out, reginput, En_sig[16],inc_R0,clk,rst); 
RegisterJnc-8 Rl(Rl_out, reginput, En_sig[17],inc_Rl,clk,rst); 
RegisterJnc-8 R2(R2_out, reginput, En_sig[18],inc_R2,clk,rst); 
RegisterJnc_8 R3(R3_out, reginput, En_sig[19],inc_R3,clk,rst); 
/ / used for reduction Register_8 Reg_A8(A8_out, reginput,En_sig[20],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A9(A9_out, reginput,En_sig[21],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A10(A10_out, reginput,En_sig[22],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_All(All_out, reginput,En_sig[23],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A12(A12_out, reginput,En_sig[24],elk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A13(A13_out, reginput,En_sig[25],clk,rst); 
Register_8 Reg_A14(A14_out, reginput,En_sig[26],clk,rst); 
/ / used for counter 
Register_8s Reg_counterl(indexl, reginput,En_sig[27],incJndexl,dec_Indexl,clk,rst); 
Register_8s Reg_counter2(index2, reginput,En_sig[28],incJndex2,dec_Index2,clk,rst); 
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always @( indexl or index2 or instr[7:0]) begin 
indexlJlag = — i n d e x l ; / / 
index2_flag = —index2; 
cmpJlagl =indexlj =instr[7:0]? 1 'b l : 1 'b0; / /comparator 
cmp_flag2=index2i=instr[7:0]?l'bl:l'b0; 
end 
/ / address register 
Register_8 addrR0(addral,R0jout,load.addrR0,clk,rst); 
Register_8 addrRl(addrbl,Rl_out,load_addrRl,clk,rst); 
Register_8 addrR2(addra2,R2_out,load_addrR2,clk,rst); 
Register^ addrR3(addrb2,R3_out,load_addrR3,clk,rst); 
mod_addsub masl(rst_addsub, Zflag,{A3_out,A2_out,Al_out,A0_out,B_out, 
sub, first, load_Cbit,clk,rst); 
mybarrelshifter bshft 1 (rst_shft,{A3_out,A2_out,A1 _out,AO_out},B_out[4:0] ,lr); 
operJCOR myxor(rst_xor, (A3_out,A2_out,Al_out,A0_out},B_out); 
multi32_3 m7(in-RAM,rst_S, A3_out,A2_out,Al_out,A0_out,rst_addsub,sel_RAM); 
rominfr roml(rom_table, enc,reginput, read_en,clk); endmodule 
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